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ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION POLICY

By Charles Shafer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

American annual consumer expenditures of nearly two trillion
dollars involve approximately sixty-four percent of the country's
Gross National Product. l A substantial portion of those consumer
purchases result in some sort of dissatisfaction. 2 The term "con
sumer dissatisfaction" represents a large continuum of feelings
ranging from mild disappointment to all consuming rage. 3 Con
'" Assoc. Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., Marietta College
(1967); J.D., Rutgers School of Law at Newark (1978); LL.M., University of Illinois
(1984).
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 432 (105th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as ABSTRACT]. The figure
given for consumer expenditures ($2,156,000,000,000)" is the amount for "Personal
Consumption Expenditures" which includes the "market value of goods and services
purchased by individuals and nonprofit institutions, and [the] value of food, clothing,
housing, and financial services received by them as income in kind." !d. at 435.
2. Professor David A. Rice reports that the "annual cost to consumers of
marketplace fraud and deception run[s] into billions of dollars." D. RICE, CONSUMER
TRANSACTIONS 18 (1975). He describes the consumer marketplace as "problem-fraught
rather than problem-free." ld. at 19. Consumer dissatisfaction is particularly difficult to
quantifY in monetary terms because only one-third of actual complaints are reported to
government agencies. Professor Rice refers to this as the "tip-of-the-iceberg
phenomenon." ld. at 1 (Supp. 1978). A recent national survey concluded that 14% of
the population was aware of having been deceived in the marketplace at least once
during a one-year period. A wide variety of deceptive practices were cited, including
sales of defective products, overcharges, use of misleading advertising, and
misrepresentation of financial arrangements. A. BEST, WHEN CONSUMERS COMPLAIN 101
(1981).
3. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders attributed some of the
civil violence of the 1960's to certain populations' beliefs that they suffered from
constant abuses by local merchants who both charged exorbitant prices and sold inferior
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sumer dissatisfaction is a serious societal problem for a variety of
reasons. It indicates a misallocation of scarce resources. 4 It can be
a significant factor in producing the perception that the economic
and political institutions are unfair, ineffective, or unresponsive.
That perception can have wide ranging political ramifications. 5 Fi
nally, it may be an indication of genuine political and economic
unfairness. 6
Consumer dissatisfaction is often caused by advertising or other
marketing practices that create unrealistic expectations on the part
of consumers regarding the properties or effectiveness of products
or services. Advertising, both true and untrue, plays a significant
role in determining how consumer dollars are spent. Approxi
mately seventy-billion dollars are spent annually on advertising.7
Therefore, the part that advertising plays in consumer misapprehen
sion regarding the properties or effectiveness of products 8 deserves
our attention.
A number of governmental institutions and substantive legal doc
trines have been established to resolve consumer disputes and to
prevent consumer dissatisfaction. The Federal Trade Commission
(Commission) often is considered the prime federal agency protect
ing consumers from false advertising. The Commission administers
a number of statutes which seek to protect consumers in the market
place;9 the most inclusive of those laws is Section Five ofthe Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTCA) which prohibits "unfair and decep
quality goods. Such exploitation was a traceable cause of civil unrest. NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 274 (1968).
4. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., L. NADER, No ACCESS TO LAw 4 (1980) ("We have also found that ...
consequences of a lack of access of judicial remedy have had a serious effect on the
machinery of government, on the mental health of Americans. and on the crime rate.")
Ms. Nader further explains that the absence of an efficient complaint processing system
leads to a search for alternatives to the law. ld.
6. The prior text sentence refers primarily to the response of people who believe
that they have been treated wrongly. This text sentence is included to highlight the fact
that even those who are not the subject of unfairness may not find unfairness acceptable.
See, e.g., D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963).
7. ABSTRACT. supra note I, at 567.
8. Throughout this paper, purchases of products under a misapprehension will
include goods, realty, and services purchased under a misapprehension regarding
usefulness for the consumer's needs.
9. For Commission regulations under statutes other than the Federal Trade
Commission Act, see 16 C.F.R. § 300 (Wool Products Labeling Act); § 301 (Fur
Products Labeling Act); § 303 (Textile Fiber Products Indentification Act); § 304
(Hobby Protection Act); § 305 (Energy Policy & Conservation Act); § 500 (Fair
Packaging & Labeling Act); § 700 (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act) (1984). The Truth in
Lending Act provides for Commission enforcement. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1982).
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tive acts and practices."IO This language has been used for eighty
four years as the basis of the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate
advertising. l l The Commission has regulated advertising by enact
ing a variety of Trade Regulation Rules 12 and by ordering various
advertisers to "cease and desist" advertising campaigns that the
Commission determines are deceptive. 13
Traditionally, identification of an advertisement as deceptive 14 in
volved a determination that the advertiser was making false claims
about the nature of the product. I5 The Commission has employed
10. Section 5 of the ¥rCA is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). Subsection 5(a)(l)
presently reads as follows: "Unfair methods of competition, in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
11. The Federal Trade Commission was established by Congress in 1914. The
original purpose behind establishment of this independent regulatory agency was to
enforce the emerging public antitrust policy. The statute creating the Commission
declared that "unfair methods of competition" were unlawful and empowered the
Commission to prevent such conduct. Act of Sept. 26,1914, ch. 311, § 45(a)(I), 38 Stat.
717, 719 (1914). The phrase was selected to avoid the implication that the statute
simply codified the. common law unfair competition doctrine. See 51 CONGo REc. 12,145
(1914) (statement of Rep. Hollis). From the beginning of its existence, the Commission
interpreted that language as preventing untruthful advertising. See, e.g., FTC V. Winsted
Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922); Sears, Roebuck & CO. V. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311
(7th Cir. 1919). That interpretation of the statute was never entirely successful.
Although courts acknowledged that "unfair methods of competition" encompassed
more than was outlawed by prior antitrust statutes and common law, they also held that
the Commission must demonstrate that there was some harm done to "competition,"
rather than consumers, by the practice it was opposing. In other words, the Commission
had to find that competitors had lost business because of the advertising. See, e.g., FTC
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931). Because untruthful advertising was likely to
harm a competitor of the advertiser by taking sales away from the competitor, it was
usually easy to establish such conduct as harmful to competition.
Nevertheless, in 1938, Congress amended § 5 of the FTCA to explicitly outlaw "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices." Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3,52 Stat. 111, III (1938)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982». Hence, the authority of the Commission to
move against false advertising was not in doubt.
The Commission's authority is illustrated by the following statement: "The definition
is broad enough to cover every form of advertisement deception over which it would be
humanly practicable to exercise governmental control. It covers every case of
imposition on a purchaser for which there could be a practical remedy." H.R. REP. No.
1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
12. The authority of the Commission to enact Trade Regulation Rules is found at 15
U.S.C. §§ 46(g), 57a(91)(B) (1982).
13. The authority of the Commission to issue cease and desist orders is found at 15
U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982).
14. Although § 5 of the FTCA also provides the Commission with jurisdiction over
unfair practices, and the Commission has recognized the failure to substantiate
advertising claims as an "unfair" practice, it is appropriate to discuss advertising
substantiation only in the context of deceptive acts or practices. That point is more fully
developed in notes 80·101 supra and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. V. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (1944); Meredith
Corp., 101 F.T.C. 390 (1983).
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another approach to the concept of deception. An advertiser vio
lates the FTCA by making claims about a product when the adver
tiser does not have a reasonable basis to believe the claim, i.e., the
advertiser lacks sufficient substantiation for the claim. This "rea
sonable basis doctrine" forms the root of what is known as the Com
mission's advertising substantiation program. I6 That program
involves (or has involved) collecting and disseminating to the public
the substantiation for particular advertising claims, as well as penal
izing advertisers who make claims without a sufficient substantiation
for those claims.
The advertising substantiation program often is recognized as a
significant aspect of the Commission's consumer protection ef
forts. I7 Nearly all complaints, decisions, and consent orders involv
ing deceptive advertising at least partly are based on the doctrine
that advertisers should have substantiation for claims. 18 The adver
tising substantiation program was the subject of one of the two ma
jor policy statements regarding consumer protection that have been
issued by the Commission during the Reagan administration. 19
A number of issues regarding the· application of the substantiation
requirement remain unresolved. Those issues involve: identifying
the standard for determining the appropriate level of substantiation
by advertisers, deciding whether substantiation developed after a
claim is made should be considered, deciding whether the Commis
sion should proceed by rule or adjudication in establishing the sub
stantiation requirement, and deciding whether the substantiation
materials should be available to the public. After a brief history of
the substantiation requirement, this article will establish a theo~eti16. The reasonable basis doctrine was first explicitly announced in Pfizer, 81 F.T.C.
23,62 (1972). To the extent that the Commission has a "program," it can be traced to a
Commission resolution announcing that advertisers will be expected to produce
substantiation on request. 36 Fed. Reg. 12,058 (1971).
17. See, e.g., F. MILLER & B. CLARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION
23 (1980) (describing activities of advertising substantiation program as "some of the
most important activities of the Commission relating to advertising"); Federal Trade
Commission, Advertising Substantiation Program, Request for Comments, 48 Fed. Reg.
10471, 10472 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Request] ("The Commission remains
committed to this principle, which has been an important element of the Commission's
program for deterring unfair and deceptive claims and preserving public confidence in
advertising. ").
18. See infra note 53.
19. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING THE
ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION PROGRAM (undated) [hereinafter cited as SUBSTANTIATION
STATEMENT]. This statement was appended to the decision in Thompson Medical Co.,
104 F.T.C. 648,839 (1984). The other policy statement deals with the definition of
deception itself. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION
(1983) [hereinafter cited as DECEPTION STATEMENT].
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cal basis for that requirement. That basis will be used to resolve the
issues which have arisen.
II.

HISTORY OF THE ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION PROGRAM

In 1971 the Commission issued a resolution requiring advertisers,
upon request, to submit whatever substantiation in support of
safety, performance, efficacy, or comparative price claims that was in
their possession at the time the claims were disseminated. 20 The
authority for this procedure was Section 6(b) of the ITCA 21 and
hence these surveys were referred to as "Section 6(b) rounds" or
"industry rounds." The questionnaires could be far reaching, ask
ing for substantiation for expressed and implied claims and even for
competitors' claims. 22 Originally, the Commission established this
requirement to make information available to consumers to enable
them to make more rational buying decisions and to encourage
competitors to challenge unfounded advertisements. 23
20. Federal Trade Commission, Special Reports Relating to Advertising Claims, 36
Fed. Reg. 12,058 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Reports]. This may have been partly in
response to a petition received by the Commission in 1970 requesting that it promulgate
a rule requiring national advertisers to make available to the Commission, and through
the Commission to the public, the scientific information they had developed to support
advertising claims. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EVOLUTION AND EVALUATION OF THE AD
SUBSTANTIATION PROGRAM SINCE 1971 5 (Dec. 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as EVOLUTION].
21. Section 6(b), Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 996-37 (1979) is
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) and provides in pertinent part as follows:
[The Commission shall also have the power to) require, by general or
special orders, persons, partnerships, and corporations engaged in or
whose business affects commerce ... to file with the Commission in such
form as the Commission may prescribe annual or special, or both annual
and special, reports. or answers in writing to specific questions,
furnishing to the commission such information as it may require as to the
organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to
other corporations, partnerships. and individuals.... Such reports and
answers shall be made under oath, or otherwise as the Commission may
prescribe, and shall be filed with the Commission within such reasonable
period as the Commission may prescribe ....
15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1982).
22. See infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text for a description of the
questionnaires.
23. The Commission identified five policy reasons in support of its action:
1. Public disclosure can assist consumers in making a rational choice
among competing claims which purport to be based on the objective
evidence and in evaluating the weight to be accorded to such claims.
2. The public's need for this information is not being met voluntarily
by advertisers.
3. Public disclosure can enhance competition by encouraging
competitors to challenge advertising claims which have no basis in fact.
4. The knowledge that documentation or the lack thereof will be
made public will encourage advertisers to have on hand adequate
substantiation before claims are made.
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However, consumers and consumer groups were reported to have
demonstrated little interest in the information after it was made
available to the public. 24 Instead, the program became little more
than an adjunct of Commission litigation against advertisers. 25 Af
ter analyzing the information submitted, the Commission could in
stitute an action against the advertiser for engaging in an unfair and
deceptive trade practice, i.e., making a claim without sub
stantiation. 26
Congress assured the demise of the advertisement substantiation
program as a vehicle for increasing the fund of product information
available to the general public by sharply limiting the ability of the
Commission to make public the information it obtained in the 6(b)
rounds. 27 The Commission no longer may release to the public in
formation gathered pursuant to a process "a purpose of which is to
determine whether any person may have violated any provision of
the laws administered by the Commission. . . ."28 Because at least
one purpose of the 6(b) request 29 is the determination of whether
the seller has violated Section 5 by failing to possess substantiation
for any advertising claims, information gathered as part of the pro
gram no longer may be made public. 30
5. The Commission has limited resources for detecting claims which
are not substantiated by adequate proof. By making documentation
submitted in response to this resolution available to the public the
Commission can be alerted by consumers, businessmen, and public
interest groups to possible violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
Reports, supra note 20.
With the adoption of this resolution, the Commission served automobile manufactur
ers with substantiation orders and has since conducted twenty-nine industry rounds. See
Request, supra note 17, at 10471; EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at App. A.
24. See infra notes 335-36 and accompanying text.
25. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 12.
26. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 87 F.T.C. 756 (1976).
27. The original authority of the Commission to release the substantiation materials
to the public was based on the following provision: "[The Commission shall have the
power to] make public from time to time such portions of the information obtained by it
hereunder as are in the public interest. ..." 15 U.S.C. § 46(1) (1982). In Section 3(a)(2)
of the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252,
§ 3(a)(2), 94 Stat. 374, 375, the following amendment was made to 15 U.S.C. 46(1):
"Provided, That the Commission shall not have any authority to make public any trade
secret or any commercial or financial information which is obtained from any person and
which is privileged or confidential. ..." 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1982).
28. Id. at § 57b-2.
29. In fact, as discussed above, this had become the primary reason for collecting the
data.
30. It does not appear that the Congress or the Commission anticipated this result of
the amendment when it was being considered.
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The requirement that advertisers against whom no misconduct
has been alleged must supply substantiation for claims is novel in
the law. A few Commission Trade Regulation Rules apply the pol
icy of requiring the submission of advertising substantiation. 31 A
few states also have imposed such requirements. 32 Congress once
considered a "Truth In Advertising Act"33 which would require
manufacturers to supply substantiation for their advertising claims
upon consumer demand and which would make it unlawful to
disseminate an advertisement without having documentation
available. 34
Closely allied to the policy of requiring advertisers to collect sub
stantiation materials is the policy of requiring advertisers to have a
certain level of support for claims. In 1972, the Commission, in Pfi
31. See, e.g., Rules for Using Energy Costs & Consumption Information Used in
Labeling and Advertising for Consumer Appliances Under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, 16 C.F.R. § 350.8(a) (1984) (requires manufacturers to submit
reports to Commission listing annual energy cost or energy efficiency ratings of
appliances and methods of exacting these ratings); Labeling and Advertising of Home
Insulation, 16 C.F:R. § 460.9 (1984) (manufacturers must keep records of methods used
to test R-values); 16 C.F.R. § 306.6 (1984) (refiners, producers, and distributors of
gasoline must keep records of octane ratings); 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (Guide for Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising states that testimonials cannot contain
information which "could not be substantiated." The language does not make dear
whether prior substantiation is required.); 16 C.F.R. § 255.2 (advertiser should be able
to substantiate that consumer endorsements are representative of consumer opinions in
general); 16 C.F.R. § 255.3 (drug endorsements must be substantiated).
32. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508 (West Supp. 1983) (advertiser whose
claims are based on effectiveness of product must provide facts on which claims are
based); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 124.09 (1983) (persons making price comparisons must
substantiate basis on which price comparison was made). The Law Department of
Colorado recently focused attention on misleading comparative price discount
advertising in one industry by requesting approximately 30 retailers to substantiate
"implied" regular prices from which items are discounted. Letter from Penelope E.
Brown, Colorado Consumer Protection Unit Legal Assistant, to Charles Shafer (Feb. 15,
1984). The Ohio Administrative Code declares it an unfair and deceptive act or practice
for a supplier to fail to document the specific factors relied upon to arrive at a sufficient
supply of an advertised good to meet consumer demand when a raincheck is not given.
OHIO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 109:4-3-03-(C)-(7) (1983). The Ohio Attorney General's
Office has used its subpoena power to require a supplier to document claims made in
advertisements. Letter of Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Ohio Attorney General, to Charles
Shafer (March 6, 1984).
33. S. 1512, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), 119 CONGo REC. 11,527-29 (1973).
34. The statute would have provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to disseminate . . . any
advertisement concerning the safety,
performance,
efficacy,
characteristics, or comparative price of any product or service unless
documentation is available at the principal office of such person in the
United States for public inspection, including the furnishing of copies of
such documentation to any person requesting such documentation....
Ill. at 11,528.
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zer, Inc., first set forth the proposition that an advertiser violated the
¥TCA by making a claim without possessing sufficient information
to constitute a "reasonable basis" for that claim. 35 In Pfizer the re
spondent had been marketing a sunburn treatment called "Un
Burn" by a variety of advertisements which the Commission con
cluded made two affirmative product claims: Un-Burn actually anes
thetizes nerves in sunburned skin and Un-Burn stops pain fast. 36
Although the Commission determined that the staff had not proven
successfully that Pfizer lacked a reasonable basis for the claims, the
Commission held that it would be an unfair practice to make such
claims without a reasonable basis. 37
There is no real common law antecedent for the proposition that
merely making a claim without substantiation (whether the claim is
true or false) is actionable. Although there is a tort doctrine that it
can be fraudulent to make a statement without the confidence im
plied in the statement,38 that doctrine is merely a substitute for the
scienter requirement in common law deceit actions,39 not a substi
tute for the requirement that the statement itself must be untrue in
order for it to be actionable. There are some earlier Commission
decisions which foreshadow the reasonable basis doctrine. In an
early case, an electronics school was charged with exaggerating the
possibilities of getting jobs in the TV industry after graduation from
the school. The court upheld the Commission, even though the
agency presented no evidence that the school was wrong in predict
ing the possibility of future jobs, because the advertiser could not
substantiate its claims. 4Q In a case involving an inflatable swimming
device, the manufacturer requested the Commission to grant a con
tinuance to give the manufacturer time to develop substantiation for
the challenged claims.41 Although the case was ostensibly decided
on the basis of rules requiring prompt action by the Commission,
the Commission stated:
While we are not deciding the instant case on such a
ground, we are inclined to think that an advertiser is under a
duty, before he makes any representation which, if false, could
cause injury to the health or personal safety of the user of the
advertised product, to make reasonable inquiry into the truth
35. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.R.C. 23, 64 (1972).
36. /d. at 65.
37. ld. at 62.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526(b} (1977) [hereinafter cited as RE
STATEMENT].
39. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
40. De Forest's Training, Inc. v. FTC, 134 F.2d 819,821 (7th Cir. 1943).
41. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1293 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964).
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or falsity of the representation. He should have in his posses
sion such information as would satisfy a reasonable and pru
dent businessman, acting in good faith, that such
representation was true. To make a representation of this
sort, without such minimum substantiation, is to demonstrate
a reckless disregard for human health and safety, and is clearly
an unfair and deceptive practice.42
Later, in Pfizer, Inc., the Commission announced the doctrine but
refused to apply it; however, the Commission since has found a
number of advertisers liable for making unsubstantiated claims.43
The scope of the reasonable basis doctrine has been discussed and
revised in a recent series of cases involving over-the-counter analge
sic products and in a Commission policy statement. 44
The policy of requiring a certain level of substantiation for claims
has surfaced in other contexts. The Commission has included sub
stantiation requirements in some rules. The Commission's Guides
Against Deceptive Pricing, adopted in 1967, require advertisers to
be "reasonably certain" that a substantial number of sales are made
at the price to which it compares its own. 45 A retailer should have
"at least a general knowledge of the prices being charged in his
area."46 Franchisers are required to have a reasonable basis for rep
resentations made to potential franchisees. 47 A few state consumer
protection laws also include substantiation requirements. 48 A sub
42. /d. at 1294.
43. The Commission has issued 24 litigated orders and 132 consent orders.
Request, supra note 17, at 10471.
44. See infra notes 107-34 and accompanying text.
45. 16 C.F.R. § 233.1(a) (1986).
46. 16 C.F.R. § 233.3(e) (1986).
47. 16 C.F.R. § 436. 1(c)(2) (1978).
48. See, e.g., WIS. § 100.21(2)(a) (West Supp. 1983) (no person may make energy
savings claim without reasonable and currently accepted scientific basis for claim when
claim is made; making energy savings or safety claim without reasonable and currently
accepted scientific basis is unfair method of competition); Conn. Dept. of Consumer
Protection Reg. § 42-110b-28(b)(l7) (1977) (new and used car dealers are required to
have reasonable belief in truth of their representations and sufficient information upon
which that belief can be based); La. Public Health & Safety Reg. § 6l7(A)(I) (1978)
(requires representations concerning effect of drugs or devices to be supported by
demonstrable scientific facts); Wis. Trans. § 139.03(2) (1983) (Automobile dealers who
make representations "concerning the motor vehicles it offers for sale, the services it
provides or other aspects of its business operation, shall possess detailed evidence of the
validity and accuracy thereof, which evidence shall be furnished ... upon request.").
The statutes of a number of states explicitly state that courts should look to Federal
Trade Commission decisions and policies for guidance. See. e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.50:545 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501-204(2) (West Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(b) (Law Co-op 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-2(4) (1983). These
states could find, therefore, that the failure to have a reasonable basis for advertising
claims is a violation of their state deceptive practices acts. There are, however, no
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stantiation requirement conceivably could be read into section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, which provides competitors with a remedy for
deceptive advertising,49 A number of advertising agencies and the
major television networks have advertising review policies of their
own.50 These policies are an effort to avoid network or agency lia
bility for deceptive advertising and, at least in the case of networks,
to keep the peace with clients who compete with one another. 51
reported cases so holding. A number of state attorneys general do assume that a
reasonable basis requirement is part of their states' law. See, e.g., Letter of Allen C.
Hoberg, North Dakota Assistant Attorney General, to Charles Shafer (Feb. 10, 1984);
Letter of Curt Loewe, Minnesota Consumer Services Unit, to Charles Shafer (Feb. 9,
1984) (Commission regulations regarding advertising substantiation are cited in suits
brought under Minnesota's Consumer Fraud Statute); Letter of Paul C. Douglas,
Nebraska Attorney General, to Charles Shafer (Feb. 9, 1984) (attempts to convince
courts that advertiser's inability to substantiate claim is unfair or deceptive act in itself);
Letter of Frank]. Kelley, Michigan Attorney General, to Charles Shafer (Feb. 6, 1984)
(while statute does not specifically require substantiation, as practical matter, in non
judicial resolution of problems substantiation of claims becomes issue).
49. The statute provides that:
Any person who shall affix, apply or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, . . . a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation, ... shall be liable to a civil action ... by
any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of
any false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Two cases have addressed the issue. In Johnson &Johnson
v. Quality Pure Mfg., 484 F. Supp. 975 (D.NJ. 1979), a television commercial was chal
lenged because it claimed that the defendant's shampoo had the same characteristics as
the plaintiff's shampoo. The plaintiff charged that the defendant "lacked a fact founda
tion" for the claim. The court stated it was "satisfied that [the statute] provides a private
cause of action to enjoin such advertising when the defendant has made the claim with
out a good faith basis, grounded on substantial pre-existing proof, to support it." [d. at
983. However, in Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241 (D. Del. 1980), the court
held that it could not accept Toro's argument that it is entitled to prevail on a claim
under § 43(a) simply by showing that a defendant's advertising claim was unsubstanti
ated. The plain language of § 43(a), which prohibits false rather than unsubstantiated
representations, requires that a plaintiff establish not merely that defendant's claim lack
substantiation but also that it is false or deceptive. ld. at 253.
50. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Company, Remarks in Response to the FTC's
Request for Comments about the Advertising Substantiation Program 3 (undated)
(Commission's Request available in 48 Fed. Reg. 10471) [hereinafter cited as NBC]
(Broadcast Standards Department started in 1934); CBS, Inc., Remarks in Response to
the FTC's Request for Comments about the Advertising Substantiation Program 2 (July
15, 1983) (Commission's Request available in 48 Fed. Reg. 10471) [hereinafter cited as
CBS] (Department of Program Practices established in 1959). The advertising agencies
currently sponsor the National Advertising Review Board. There are a variety of other
associations, model codes, and standards committees which can be traced back to the
early 1910's. 119 CONGo REC. 11527, 11528 (1973) (Statement of Sen. Moss).
5l. See, e.g., CBS, supra note 50, at 2 (emphasizing that network does not want to be
viewed as uquasi enforcement agency"); NBC, supra note 50, at 18 (substantiation
program is part of their effort to mediate challenges of one sponsor's advertisements by
another). With regard to the liability of advertising agencies, see, e.g., Porter & Dietsch
v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980) (considers
agency's knowing participation in deception); Ogilvy & Mather InCI, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 1,
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The Commission also has made advertising substantiation re
quirements part of cease and desist orders where the advertiser has
been found guilty of deception. Often this is done under the theory
that the Commission may "fence in" advertisers who have engaged
in deceptive practices and who the Commission fears will find some
way of evading an order which merely requires the advertisers to
cease engaging in the deceptive conduct found to have occurred.
For example, in Tashof v. FTC, the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit approved a requirement that a seller of eye
glasses refrain from selling any merchandise at a "discount" price
unless it first takes a "statistically significant survey" that shows the
prevailing price is "substantially" higher than its price. 52 Because
the Commission commonly includes in all complaints filed under
§ 5 of the FTCA allegations that claims are both untrue and unsub
stantiated, this writer has difficulty distinguishing "deception" and
"substantiation" cases. 53
In 1983 the Commission requested all interested parties to submit
comments on a variety of questions regarding the advertising sub
stantiation program. 54 A number of manufacturers, retailers, adver
tising agencies, television networks, and other parties submitted
comments on the program. After reviewing those comments, the
Commission issued a policy statement revising some aspects of the
program. 55 The Commission formally abandoned resort to
15 (1983) (agency is liable for deceptive claims; claims must be substantiated but agency
may rely on expert judgment of client); McCaffrey & McCall, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 367, 369
(1983) (agency must obtain substantiation for all claims; no permission to rely on
client's judgment).
52. 437 F.2d 707, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Camp Chevrolet, 84 F.R.C. 648
(1974) (order required substantiation by competent scientific tests because
manufacturer had made false claims regarding nature of tests shown television
audience).
53. A review of all advertising cases beginning with Volume 100 of FTC Reports
shows that all cases with a substantiation charge also have a charge that the claim is
untrue. Only five cases involving untruth do not have a charge of lack of substantiation.
See Kimberly Int'l, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,282 (Aug. 19, 1985); Jim Clark's Beef,
Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,013 (May 3, 1983); Encyclopedia Britanica, Inc., 100
F.T.C. 500 (1982); Nat'l Ass'n of Scuba Diving Schools, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 439 (1982);
American Motors Corp., 100 F.T.C. 229 (1982).
The Commission's rationale is particularly difficult to ascertain because every case
since 1982 involved a consent order, except for the over-the-counter analgesic cases
discussed in this article. Therefore, no facts are presented other than those that can be
gleaned from the complaint.
54. Request, supra note 17. The Summary of the Commission staff's review of the
comments is included in ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION PROGRAM, ANALYSIS OF PuBLIC
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDED CHANGES ijuly 23, 1984).
55. SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19; Remarks of William Miller III,
Chairman, FTC on FTC's Ad Substantiation Program 3 (Wash. D.C., March 23, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Miller]. William Miller III was President Reagan's first appointee as
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"rounds" as a device for determining whether advertisers have sub
stantiation. Hence, the Commission will question all advertisers on
an individual basis and will not make the nature of investigations
public. 56 The Commission reiterated the policy of requiring sub
stantiation prior to making products claims. 57 The Commission de
cided that post claim substantiation should be considered in
determining the public interest58 in proceeding against an adver
tiser, evaluating the adequacy of pre-claim substantiation, and fash
ioning an appropriate remedy.59
III.

JUSTIFICATION

A.

Deception

To evaluate Commission policy and to resolve issues arIsmg
under the advertising substantiation program, it is important to first
clearly articulate the justification for substantiation requirements.
Despite the fact that substantiation policies have received considera
ble attention, there has not been a clear understanding of the role
advertising substantiation plays in the Commission's fight against
deceptive advertising. Commission cases devote little space to set
ting forth the connection between the failure to have a prescribed
level of substantiation for claims and the prevention of unfair or de
ceptive advertising. In the Commission's most recent policy state
ment on the substantiation program, the only attempt to clarify the
underlying rationale of the substantiation requirement is the Com
mission's reasoning that false claims of substantiation are proof that
a claim is "material."60 However, that does not justify a substantia
tion requirement that is independent of a requirement that the ad
vertising claims be true. Moreover, an advertiser may make an
unsubstantiated claim because the advertiser does not believe the
claim is material, such as the type of claim considered "puffing." A
good deal of the difficulty in articulating the standard to be applied
can be traced to this failure to clarify the goals of the program.
There are two ways in which the requirement that advertisers posChairman of the Commission. He has recently been named Director of the Office of
Management and Budget.
56. SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 6.
57. !d. at 7.
58. The FTCA requires that Commission action be brought in the public interest.
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982).
59. SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 6.
60. "[C]onsumers would be less likely to rely on claims for products or services if
they knew the advertisers did not have a reasonable basis." SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT,
supra note 19, at 2.
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sess adequate substantiation is significant in combatting deceptive
advertising.
First, expressed or implied claims of substantiation are significant
to consumers because they relate to the likelihood that a claim is
true. It may be difficult or impossible to determine whether many
claims are or are not in fact true. 61 For example, many personal
computers are sold with the claim that they will be of benefit to a
child's ability to compete in school or to succeed in later life. 62 Be
cause we cannot be sure of our ability to predict the future, it is
probably impossible to determine whether such claims are true.
Some claims may be susceptible to reasonably objective proof, but
the results will vary from consumer to consumer. For example, a
pain reliever may work faster for particular types of pain or particu
lar consumers. No consumer could know without trying such a
product how it will perform.
Finally, claims may be difficult or impossible for consumers to
evaluate even after purchase. Comparative product claims may not
be subject to evaluation unless the consumer engages in extensive
testing, which.is virtually impossible. In all of the above situations,
consumers realize that there is no way to be sufe if claims are "true"
or "false." Consumers understand that they are taking a risk. 63 Yet
the above situations represent those in which deception is most
likely.64 When consumers believe that advertisers have tested prod
61. In FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, MEMORANDUM, ADVERTISING
SUBSTANTIATION 15-18 (Nov. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as MEMORANDUM], it is argued
that consumers are deceived when a purchased product has a smaller likelihood of
success than they thought.
Consumers will not necessarily assume that the advertised outcome will occur with
certainty. Support claims are valuable because they give consumers a basis for
estimating the chances that they will actually receive the advertised benefit. !d. at 4.
62. See, e.g., Ally Execs Derail Commodore Criticism, ADVERTISING AGE, October 31, 1983,
at 64; T I Takes Education Track, ADVERTISING AGE, October 3, 1983, at 1; Galanter,
Honing in on Computers, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, September, 1984, at 30.
63. To the extent that consumers do not understand that a risk is being taken, we
could conclude that the advertising has convinced consumers that there is an extremely
high probability that the advertising claims will prove true.
64. One line of thought which might suggest where deception occurs began with
Philip Nelson, who divided goods into search and experience goods. Nelson, Advertising
as lriformation, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Advertising]; Nelson,
Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
lriformation]. Goods which consumers prefer to investigate before purchasing are search
goods. lriformation, supra at 372. Nelson gives the contrasting examples of canned tuna
and a dress. A consumer cannot tell much about the tuna before purchase. Therefore,
it is an experience good. A consumer can, however, examine a dress thoroughly before
purchasing. Nelson states that advertising for search goods often provides direct
information about the product. The most important information conveyed about
experience goods "is simply that the brand advertises." Advertising, supra at 730. Nelson
states that "the major control that consumers have over the market for experience
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ucts prior to making claims, they believe that the products more
likely will perform as advertised. In this way, the advertising sub
stantiation doctrine is a specialized form of Commission action
against deceptive implied claims in advertising. The implied claims
concern the likelihood that a particular statement is true.
This justification of the advertising substantiation doctrine is re
lated to Commission action regarding the use of testimonials and
endorsements in advertising. 65 In 1975, the Commission adopted
an industry guide regarding the use of endorsements and testimoni
als. 66 The Commission requires that endorsements reflect the hon
qualities is whether they repeat the purchase of a brand or not." !d. The conclusion he
reaches is that it is not necessary to have any legal protection for misleading advertising.
In the case of search goods, consumers can conduct an adequate inspection and, in the
case of experience goods consumers, should expect to need to test out the product. !d.
at 741. In fact, he suggests that advertising regulation may be counterproductive
because it will cause people to have an unreasonably high expectation for truthfulness in
advertising. !d. at 750.
Two refinements of Nelson's work are relevant here. One involves adding a new
category: credence goods. The other involves recognizing search, experience, and
credence qualities in all goods. The concept ofcredence goods is contrasted with search
and experience goods. See Darby & Kami, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount ofFraud,
16 J. L. & ECON. 67 (1973). Whereas the value of some goods can be ascertained by the
search process before purchase or by experience after purchase, the value of some
goods cannot be ascertained by the normal consumer at all. The example given is an
automobile repair shop. Often a customer must rely on the word of the repair shop that
a given part is needed and that it works well. The market for credence goods is one in
which fraud is more likely. The writers suggests a variety of factors which would make
fraud less likely, e.g., where the seller is operating at capacity, where the seller expects a
long term relationship with the buyer which would be harmed if the fraud were
uncovered, and where there is a warranty of some sort. [d. at 76.
These concepts are made more helpful to us by recognizing that they represent
qualities which can be present in all goods and that they represent relative points on a
continuum rather than discrete qualities. See Jordan & Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the
Law of False Advertising, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 527, 531 (1979). Jordan and Rubin point out
that as qualities in goods move along the continuum from search to credence the
likelihood of fraud increases. [d. at 531. It is more likely, then, that there will be fraud
to the extent that advertising messages contain claims that consumers never practically
can evaluate, such as the speed of headache remedies, the likelihood of future
conditions, and the importance that a particular product plays in the success of an
athlete. See, e.g., American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681,698 (3d Cir. 1983)
("Because consumers cannot accurately rate the products for themselves, advertising,
and the expectations which it engenders, becomes a significantly more influential source
of consumer beliefs than it would otherwise."). This may be a way of saying that the
most deceptive messages would be those that focus on the "credence" qualities that are
present in all commodities. Joskow, Comments on Peltzman, 24 J. L. & ECON. 403, 450
(1981).
65. See, e.g., Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 303 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980) (presentation of testimonials implies that typical users
experience same results).
66. 16 C.F.R. § 255 (1985). Industry guides were adopted prior to the clear
statutory grant of rulemaking power. Violation of a guideline does not have the same
consequences as violation of a rule.
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est opinions of the endorser and that an endorser's qualifications be
as represented. 67 For example, in 1937 the Commission proceeded
against an encyclopedia publisher for falsely claiming testimonials
for its publication. 68 While a consumer is concerned with how use
ful an encyclopedia will be, rather than with who likes the encyclo
pedia, the consumer realizes that at the time of purchase he or she
can make a judgment regarding only the likelihood that the product
will serve the purpose for which it is purchased. The endorsements
persuade the consumer in making that judgment. The regulation of
the truth or falsity of statements is not of direct concern to consum
ers. The regulation of testimonials and endorsements is, therefore,
not the regulation of the truth or falsity of statements, but the regu
lation of implied claims regarding the likelihood that product qual
ity claims are true.
A second theoretical basis for the advertising substantiation pro
gram is that it is part of the Commission's effort to attack conduct of
advertisers which may not necessarily involve actual misstatements
about a particular product, but which, if allowed, would create an
environment in which a significant amount of misstatements are
likely to be made. Essentially the rationale is as follows: If one
makes claims without knowing whether they are true or false, it is
more likely that the claims will be false than if one only makes claims
on the basis of relevant information regarding the product. In this
regard the truth or falsity of a particular claim is not relevant. Even
if the claim is true, the advertiser has engaged in a deceptive prac
tice, if the advertiser has failed to test the claim before disseminat
ing it. Hence, the purpose of the program is to achieve a higher
level of accuracy in all advertisements by compelling sellers to con
duct better testing of potential claims. 69 The FTCA comprehends

67. 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.1 (a), 255.3(a) (1985).
68. ITC v. Standard Educ. Soc., 302 U.S. 112 (1937); see also Hall & Ruchel, Inc., 32
F.T.C. 229 (1940) (representations that product endorsed by physicians and scientists
were false).
69. Robert Pitofsky has stated:
[I]f the advertising substantiation rule is justifiable at all, it is for
reasons not touched upon in Commission opinions. A prior
substantiation rule should trigger a process of advertising review ... which
should help to eliminate or curtail the quantity of inaccurate information
in the market place. Enthusiastic marketing people would no longer be
able to put off demands for substantiation with the response that the data
will be made available when and if needed but would have to accumulate
substantiating evidence before making the claim.
Pitofsky, Advertising Re{fUlation and the Consumer Movement, in ISSUES IN ADVERTISING: THE
ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION 27, 36 (D. Tuerck ed. 1978).
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such a policy by proscribing "deceptive" acts as opposed to merely
proscribing"deception."
It is also important to emphasize that in this context, consumer
expectations with regard to the amount of substantiation are not rel
evant. Regardless of the amount of substantiation consumers ex
pect advertisers to have, the Commission is making an independent
judgment of the amount of substantiation sellers making particular
kinds of claims should have. Proscription of industry practices that
may lead to deception can be found in a number of Commission ac
tions. For example, in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., the court held
that it was a deceptive trade practice to represent that a televised
demonstration provided visual proof of a product claim when the
televised demonstration did not do so, even if the claim itself was
true. 70 Colgate television advertisements claimed to show that
"Rapid Shave" shaving cream enabled a razor to shave sandpaper.
Actually, in the televised demonstration, the substance that ap
peared to be sandpaper was a simulated paper made of plexiglass to
which sand had been applied. Although the product actually could
shave sandpaper, if real sandpaper h~d been used it would have ap
peared to television viewers as just plain paper.71 Additionally, the
mock-up allowed a shorter time span between application and shav
ing than did the sand paper. The court and the Commission had
difficulty articulating the harm. Although there was an implicit lie
(i.e., "what you are seeing is sandpaper being shaven"), viewers
probably would not have been concerned that the demonstration
was actually that of sandpaper being shaven as long as the product
could perform as claimed. 72 Therefore, the lie did not harm con
sumers in that instance. Rather, the decision can be seen as based
on fears regarding the power of television advertising to deceive
people. One way to guard against that risk would be to have a firm,
clear rule that viewers should always be informed when there is any
kind of simulation. 73
70. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).

71. /d. at 376-77.
72. This assumes that viewers care that they would have been able to shave
sandpaper.
73. Robert Pitofsky defends the Colgate decision on the ground that the issues which
a "mock-up defense" would generate "may tend to complicate and lengthen an
otherwise simple fraudulent demonstration case." Pitofsky, supra note 69, at 69l. This
theory may be the same as that presented in the text. The theory defends a finding of
deception on the basis that if the conduct were allowed, proving deception would be too
difficult. Phony "mock-ups" have not been pursued by the Commission since Colgate.
[d. at 692. Another case which illustrates this concept of deception involved
misrepresentation regarding a gasoline additive. The use of language like "Here's
proof" and "You're about to see proof" and the appearance in the demonstration of
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Another example of proscription of industry practices that may
lead to deception is seen in the Commission's Vocational School
Rule, which, inter alia, required proprietary vocational and home
study schools to provide pro rata refunds to students who withdrew
from their courses. 74 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit partially invalidated the rule because the penalties
were not to be based on specific misstatements by the schools. 75
The court invalidated the refund and job placement provisions of
the rule. 76 The court was in essence unable to see a non pro-rata
refund policy as deceptive. However, it can be viewed as deceptive
in the sense discussed above. The Commission was concerned
about a multitude of deceptive statements, each of which would be
difficult to detect and proscribe with sufficient clarity. Moreover, to
enforce a proscription of each individual deceptive statement would
require constant monitoring by the Commission. 77 The pro-rata re
fund provision, therefore, placed the risk on the school that stu
complicated measuring instruments and white-coated technicians contributed to an
impression that. scientific testing was behind the advertising. Yet the televised
demonstration far exceeded the actual effects of the additive. Although there was no
proof that the additive could not fulfill the claims, the court concluded that the conduct
was deceptive. Here again the Commission apparently was most concerned that the
unchecked use of the television medium would make the presence of untrue claims more
likely. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1472 (1974).
74. 16 C.F.R. § 438.4 (1984). The rule also provided that schools must provide
information to prospective students concerning the schools' graduation and placement
records. The rule extended the "cooling off period" on vocational school enrollments
contracts to fourteen days. ld. at 438.3. See Vocational Schools Trade Regulation Rule
Statement of Basis and Purpose, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,796 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Vocational Statement].
75. Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 664 (2d Cir. 1979).
76. /d. at 662-65. The court invalidated the refund and job placement provision of
the rule. The court objected to that provision on two grounds. First, the court stated
that the Commission had not defined with adequate specificity the unfair or deceptive
acts or practices which the provision prevented. /d. at 662. (The statutory provision
requiring that the deceptive act be stated with specificity is at 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(1)(B)
(1982». The court held that the statutory requirement of specific definition of the
deceptive acts "would be meaningless if the only unfair acts or practices defined in the
rule were possible future violations of [the Commission'S] remedial requirements." ld..
Second, the court rejected the Commission's position that the rule was intended to
combat a variety of deceptive practices because the rule "penalizes every vocational
school for every student" dropout regardless of the reason for dropping out. The court
held that there was "no rational connection between the Commission's universally
applicable refund requirements and the prevention of specifically described unfair and
deceptive enrollment practices." ld. at 664.
77. The Commission found that:
Among the most prevalent of such misrepresentations are exaggerated
or false statements concerning a school's equipment and facilities; the
quality of instruction provided; the availability of part-time employment
opportunities during the course; refund policy provisions; and
accreditations and government approval of courses.
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dents would discover after beginning courses that the school was
not for them. This would be an incentive for the school to be as
truthful as possible. 78
The courts' restricted reading of the FTCA's requirements with
regard to trade regulation rules stems from the failure of the court
to recognize that the absence of the procedures mandated by the
Commission was "deceptive," because that absence tended to in
duce deception even though the absence of the procedures is not in
and of itself deception. Moreover, many Commission rules had al
ready set out required conduct, the absence of which would not nec
essarily constitute deception. 79
B.

Unfairness

The FTCA prohibits unfair as well as deceptive acts and prac
tices. so In fact, the first case to set forth the "reasonable basis" doc
trine was premised on the concept of unfairness and not
deceptiveness. 81 Subsequent cases, however, have grounded sub
stantiation requirements in deception or have suggested that "un
fairness" and "deception" are interchangeable. 82 Both a recent
Two additional types of misrepresentations have a particularly serious
impact on the prospective enrollee's ability to make a rational purchase
decision. First, schools often dissuade students from reflecting on their
decision to enroll by falsely claiming that rigid enrollment deadlines
exist....
Second, schools have misrepresented the selectivity of their admissions
process through false claims about the use of an admissions screening
committee.
Vocational Statement, supra note 74, at 60,799.
78. Gibbs, 612 F.2d at 663. 678. "No longer will schools be able to derive any
significant financial benefit from engaging in unfair or deceptive enrollment practices."
Vocational Statement, supra note 74, at 60,799.
79. For example, advertisements providing care information that does not meet the
specific requirements of 16 C.F.R. § 423 (1985) (Care Labeling of Textile Wearing
Apparel) would not be deceptive in the sense of conveying misleading information;
however, they would be deceptive in the sense of violating the FTCA.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). At times the Commission has labeled conduct as either
"unfair" or "deceptive." Usually, however, the Commission describes conduct as either
unfair or deceptive and leaves it at that.
81. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972). In Pfizer, the Commission suggested that
the advertising was unfair because it was more economically efficient to require
advertisers, rather than consumers, to test claims.
82. See, e.g., Stihl, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 840, 843 (1983) (complaint alleged advertising
practices constituted unfair and deceptive acts). But see Porter & Dietsch v. FTC, 605
F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980) (substantiation requirements
grounded only in deception). The Commission seems to believe that there is no
distinction between the two:
The application of the "reasonable basis" test, based on deception, is
to be distinguished from the Commission's review of the question of
advertising substantiation in the context of our recent decision in Pfizer,
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Commission decision and a recent Commission policy statement
suggest a return to "unfairness" as a theoretical basis for the
program. 83
However, because both of the justifications for a reasonable basis
requirement involve the Commission's authority to proceed against
"deceptive" practices, there is no need to ground the policy in the
Commission's authority over "unfair" practices. It is important to
establish that basing the program on unfairness does not aid injusti
fying Commission action. This is due to the less than successful
struggle on the part of the Commission and the courts to give mean
ing to the word "unfair." In 1964 the Commission proposed the
following definition:
[T]he factors that determine whether a particular act or
practice should be forbidden [as unfair] are as follows: (1)
whether the practice, without necessarily having been previ
ously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise
whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of
some common law, statutory, or other established concept of
unfairness;' (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to con
sumers (or competitors or other businessmen).84
This standard was once cited favorably by the United States
Supreme Court. 85 The Commission has proposed other standards
for identifying unfairness, including one in 1978 which appeared to
Inc. . . . There we considered the impact of unsubstantiated, affinnative
product claims as a matter of marketplace fairness; our decision was
grounded exclusively on the unfairness . . . . Whether an advertisement is
analyzed from the standpoint of unfairness Qr deception, however. the standard for
evaluating the substantiating material and test which is applied is the same-does
the substantiation provide a reasonable basis to support the claim.
National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 550 n.10 (1973), modified, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974) (emphasis added).
It is not clear whether National Dynamics represents a departure from the economic
efficiency justification as a basis for the Pfizer court's finding of unfairness.
83. See Substantiation Statement, supra note 19; see also Thompson Medical Co., 104
F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984).
84. Cigarette Rule Statement of Basis & Purpose, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8354-55
(1964).
85. FTC v. Speery & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,244 n. 5 (1972). The Comission
has paraphrased the three factors that it considers in applying the unfairness prohibition
as; "(1) whether the practice injures consumers; (2) whether it violates established
public policy; (3) whether it is unethical or unscrupulous." Letter of the FTC to
Senators Wendell Ford and John Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in FTC Act
Amendments and Authorization, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 598, at 35 (May 31, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as LetterJ.
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retreat from the second set of factors listed above. The restated test
was:
(1) Whether the acts or practices result in substantial harm
to consumers. In making this determination both the eco
nomic and social benefits and the losses flowing from the chal
lenged conduct must be assessed, and (2) Whether the
challenged conduct offends public policy.86
In a recent response to a Congressional inquiry regarding the pa
rameters of the unfairness concept, the Commission set forth a se
ries of considerations which more closely paralleled the standards
set forth in 1964. The Commission stated that the most important
criteria was "unjustified consumer injury."87 Such injury must be
substantial; it "must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer
or competitive benefits that the sales practice also produces, and it
"must be [an injury] which consumers could not reasonably have
avoided."88
One writer has surveyed Commission unfairness cases in an effort
to develop some guides as to where the Commission is likely to find
unfairness. 89 His survey suggests t,hat the standard is used when
there is some harm other than untruthfulness and most often when
there is some activity which prevents efficiency in the market
place. 90 He concludes by agreeing with the United States Supreme
Court that the term unfair "does not admit of precise definition"
86. Advertising of Opthalmic Goods and Services, Statement of Basis and Purpose,
43 Fed. Reg. 23992, 24000-01 (1978).
87. Letter, supra note 85, at 35.
88. !d. at 36-37. The standard is obviously economic (cost/benefit) in nature, but
with perplexing use of words like "substanti~r' and "reasonably." The Commission
implies that even if the injury outweighs the benefits of not preventing it, there might be
Commission inaction if the injury is not substantial or if the consumer has not acted
reasonably, the substantialness and reasonableness to be judged by some other criteria.
Those other criteria are not set out.
89. Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission
(198]),81 WIS. L. REV. 107 (1981).
90. For example, the withholding of material information might be unfair if the "lack
of easily obtainable comparative information had eliminated sellers' incentives to
compete by offering a better grade of product." !d. at 11 7.
One example given is the Commission's requiring manufacturers and distributers of
insulation material to determine and publicize the "R-Value," That was necessary
because
it would be prohibitively expensive for consumers to measure or observe
the effectiveness of different brands of insulation on their own. At the
same time, no seller had sufficient incentive to provide the information
because it would first have to bear the entire expense of educating
consumers as to the significance of the R-Value, an expense which would
later benefit other firms as well.
Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 44 Fed.
Reg. 5018, 5022 (1979).
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and that its meaning must be arrived at by "the gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion. "91 Many other people have made
similar statements when attempting to give the term some mean
ing. 92 In fact, even the Commission, attempting to convince Con
gress that the term had some definable meaning (at least in
application), began its discussion conceding that the term itself
gives little guidance as to its meaning, but arguing that Congress
understood this when it intentionally selected the term.93
Congress may change its mind. Concern about the inability to
arrive at a comprehensible definition of "unfair" has led to criticism
that the term is too vague and that, therefore, the Commission's ap
plication of it may be too unpredictable. 94 Congress has, for exam
ple, restricted the use of the regulation of advertising directed at
children on the basis of unfairness95 and has flirted with the idea of
prohibiting all regulation of advertising on the basis of unfairness,96
including prohibiting a statutory definition of unfairness. 97
Another example of conduct which does not involve untruthfulness, but which is
wrong, because it prohibits the efficient operation of markets or because it violates some
other standard of propriety, is conduct which restricts consumers' post-purchase rights.
Craswell, supra note 89, at 131.
91. !d. at 153 (quoting FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643. 648 (1931».
92. HIn the twelve years since the Court's ruling in S & H, the FTC has not clarified
the meaning of the unfairness standard by carefully documented studies or thoughtful
explanations of why particular practices are unfair to consumers." Gellhorn, Trading
Stamps, S & H, and the FTC's Unfairrtess Doctrine, 1983 DUKE LJ. 903 (1983).
93. Letter, supra note 85, at 34-35. See, e.g., All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc., 75 F.T.C.
465, 490 (1969).
94. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization 1983, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House Committee on Energy &
Commerce, 98th Cong., lst Sess., 14, 18,22,23,27 (1983) (Statements ofJames C. Miller
III, David A. Clanton, and Patricia P. Bailey) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; FTC
Amendments & Authorizations, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 598, at 5 (May 31, 1983); FTC
Act Amendments, [1982] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 545, at 16, 51 (June 7, 1982); FTC
Act Amendments, [1982] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 561, at 13 (Sept. 27, 1982);
Craswell, supra note 89, at 3 n. 7.
95. Section II (a) of the 1980 FTC Improvement Act prevents the Commission from
promulgating any rule regarding children's advertising on the basis of unfairness.
Federal Trade Commission Authorization, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 436, at 6 (May 6,
1980). The amendment is now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57c (1982).
96. In 1982. the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
proposed that § 5 be amended to provide that, H[T]he Commission shall have no
authority ... to prohibit or otherwise regulate any commercial advertising on the basis of a
determination by the Commission that such commercial advertising constitutes an unfair
act or practice in or affecting commerce." FTC Act Amendments [1982] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) No. 545, at 34 (June 7, 1982) (emphasis added).
97. In 1982 and 1983, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce proposed
the following definition of unfairness:
An act or practice in or affecting commerce shall be considered to be
an unfair act or practice . . . if
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The nebulousness of the concept of unfairness results from the
lack of an indication of the harm or the type of conduct at which it is
directed. Despite the difficulty in achieving precision in defining
"deception," that basis for an action at least identifies the nature of
the harm it seeks to avoid (i.e., people having incorrect information)
and the nature of the conduct it seeks to prohibit (i.e., communica
tions which convey incorrect information). Where the standard the
Commission uses is nebulous, it is politically easier to attack actions
based on that standard. To adequately protect consumers, Congress
may have to resort to such an indeterminate word through which
diverse harms can be attacked. 98 The Commission need not rely on
"unfairness" for support of the advertising substantiation doc
trine,99 because the program in all of its phases deals with the prob
(i) such act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers, and
(ii) such substantial irtiury (1) is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers; and (II) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition which result from such act or practice.
Any determination under the precedi.ng sentence regarding whether an
act or practice is an unfair act or practice shall take into account, in
addition to other relevant factors, whether such act or practice violates
any public policy as established by Federal or State statutes, common law,
practices in business or industry, or otherwise. This subparagraph shall
not have any force or effect, and shall not be taken into account, in
connection with the enforcement of any State law which prevents
persons, partnerships or corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the
State from engaging in unfair acts or practices.
FTC Amendments & Authorizations, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 598, at 5 (May 31,
1983); FTC Act Amendments [1982J TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 561, at 19 (Sept. 17,
1982).
In 1982, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation proposed
the following definition:
[Ulnfair acts or practices are acts or practices that have caused or are
likely to cause substantial il'\jury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by counter
vailing benefits to consumers or competition.
FTC Act Amendments [1982] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 561, at 79 (Sept. 17, 1982).
Congressional opposition to action based on the concept of unfairness may be moti
vated by concerns about the specific interests that are threatened by the Commission.
The concern about unfairness is being expressed at the same time that a large number
of special interests are seeking and receiving Congressional protection from the Com
mission. See, e.g., S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA 159-69 (1983); M.
PERTSCHUCK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION 69-117 (1982).
98. See, e.g., FTC Act Amendments & Authorizations, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), No. 598, at
42 (May 31,1983). An example ofa type of practice which may be unfair but could not
be considered deceptive involved including free samples of razor blades in advertising
supplements to home delivered newspapers, without any protective packaging that
would keep children from using them. Philip Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16 (1973).
99. The Commission in Pfizer, Inc., concluded that advertising without a reasonable
basis is unfair. The Commission based its conclusion on an economic analysis,
reasoning that it is often more efficient for sellers to test claims than for consumers to
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lem of incorrect consumer information, as established above.lOo
First, the advertising substantiation doctrine does involve untruthful
statements, albeit often implied, that advertisers have information
they do not in fact have, and that an advertising claim is being made
with a certain degree of confidence. lol Second, the doctrine in
volves conduct which makes untrue statements more likely to occur.
It is therefore unnecessary, and may be counterproductive, to dis
cuss advertising substantiation in terms of unfairness, a vague and
often ill-favored concept.
C.

Summary: "Deceptive S and Deceptive P"

There are two justifications for characterizing many unsubstanti
ated claims as deceptive. The first involves an express or implied
misstatement regarding the truth of a claim. For the balance of this
article, "deceptive" in this sense will be denominated "deceptive'"
(the "s" standing for "statement"). The second justification in
volves conduct that is likely to lead to deception. For the balance of
this article, "deceptive" in this sense will be denominated "decep
tive P " (for deceptive practice).

IV.

THE REQUIRED LEVEL OF SUBSTANTIATION

A.

Confusing Standards

Since unveiling the substantiation doctrine, the Commission has
not clearly articulated how much substantiation should be required
of advertisers. Although the Commission generally has recognized
that the same level of precision may not be appropriate for all claims
for all products, there has been considerable discussion of what fac
tors should affect the decision regarding the level of substantiation
required in particular circumstances. Pfizer, Inc. established the gen
eral principle that advertisers should have a "reasonable basis" for
their claims. 102 Other cases have referred to the "amount of sub
stantiation which would satisfy a reasonably prudent businesstest claims, and that consumers take an economic gamble when they purchase products
where the seller has not confirmed claims. 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972). The concern for
efficiency is dealt with in the definitions of "deceptive" presented earlier. See supra notes
66-67 and accompanying text.
100. In recent discussions of the advertising substantiation program, Chairman Miller
has spoken only in terms of deceptiveness. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 55.
10l. This article acknowledges that the falsity of the express or implied statement
regarding substantiation is not the ultimate issue in a § 5 action.
102. 81 F.T.C. 23, 73 (1972).
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man;"103 "tests or surveys using statistically valid methodology;"I04
or "competent and objective" material. 105
The lack of clarity as to what is required to satisfy the advertising
substantiation requirement has been described as "reasonable basis
turmoil," with "the extent of a manufacturer's obligation to sub
stantiate its advertisements ... unclear," and replete with "confu
sion, inconsistencies, and overall unpredictability."lo6
The area in which the Commission has labored the most to de
velop advertising substantiation standards involves over-the
counter analgesics. In Pfizer, the Commission rejected the proposi
tion that "the only reasonable basis for performance or effectiveness
representations for a drug or medical product would be fully docu
mented, adequate, and well-controlled scientific studies."lo7 The
Commission would have accepted medical literature, clinical experi
ence, or general medical knowledge as a reasonable basis. lOS How
ever, the Commission set out the following factors which affect the
level of substantiation required:
(1) the type and specificity of the claim made-e.g., safety,
efficacy, dietary, health, medical; (2) the type ofproduct~.g.,
food, drug, potentially hazardous consumer product, other
consumer product; (3) the possible consequences of a false
103. National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973), modified, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974).
104. Camp Chevrolet, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 648, 652 (1974).
105. Jay Norris, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 989, 1015 (1978), modified, 598 F.2d 1244, 1253 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979). In Norris, the Commission had set forth the
following requirement:
[Advertisers must base their claims on] competent and reliable
scientific tests . . . in which one or more persons with education,
knowledge and experience in the field conduct a test and evaluate its
results in an objective manner using testimony, evaluation and analysis
procedures accepted in the profession ... [and which] accurately predict
... the results that a consumer ordinarily would obtain using the product
under normal household conditions."
ld. A similar standard is set forth in Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1972 (1974);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 FTC. 398, 463 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
106. Comment, The Substantiation Program: You Can Fool All of the People Some of the Time
and Some 0/ the People All ofthe Time, But Can You Fool the FTC?, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 429, 455
56 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. One advertiser claims that the Commission
staff "seems to believe that all claims should be subject to absolute proof." Sears,
Roebuck & Co., Remarks in Response to the FTC's Request for Comments About the
Advertising Substantiation Program 18 (March 11, 1983) (Commission's request
available in 48 Fed. Reg. 10471) [hereinafter cited as Sears]. The same advertiser also
has said that the requirement merely means that for every claim there must be merely a
document in the file. ld. at 16.
107. 81 F.T.C. 23, 65 (1972).
108. ld. at 72-73.
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claim-e.g., personal injury, property damage; (4) the degree
of reliance by consumers on the claims; (5) the type, and ac
cessibility, of evidence adequate to form a reasonable basis for
making the particular claims. 109
The Commission gave no indication as to how these factors are to
be evaluated, weighed, and applied in practice. 1lO
In American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, the court approved a very
complete and exacting cease and desist order for many claims re
garding superior effectiveness or superior freedom from side effects
for non- prescription analgesics. I I 1 The order covered both claims
with an implied assertion of support by scientific evidence and
claims that the manufacturer had not qualified by stating that there
was a substantial question regarding the claim. In Bristol-Myers
Co., 112 the Commission required at least two well- controlled clinical
studies 1l3 for "establishment" claims that any non- prescription in
ternal analgesics were superior to other brands in effectiveness or
freedom from side effects. 1 14 The Commission also prohibited Bris
tol-Myers from making any representations concerning therapeutic
performance or freedom from side effects of any non-prescription
internal analgesic without a "reasonable basis" consisting of "com
petent and reliable scientific evidence." I I!> In a companion case, the
Commission required the makers of Bayer aspirin to have two or
more adequate, well-controlled, clinical investigations to support
any claim that superior effectiveness had been established, to have a
"reasonable basis" for other therapeutic performance claims, and to
have "competent and reliable scientific evidence" for a claim of su
perior freshness, purity, stability, or speed of disintegration of
products. 1 16
In American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, the Commission dealt with
the advertising of Anacin. The Commission introduced two doc
trines regarding the application of the substantiation requirement:
the establishment claims doctrine and the substantial question doc
109. /d. at M.

110. Presumably the Commission recognized the imprecision of the rule it was
establishing when it recognized that the factors were "overlapping considerations." /d.
Ill. 695 F.2d 681, 714·15 (3d Cir. 1983).
112. 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aif'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984).
113. Well·controlled clinical tests require that the perfonnance of the drug be
compared with the perfonnance of a "placebo." A statistically significant sampling must
be used and patients must be randomly selected for either the drug or the placebo. The
test must be "double blind," that is neither the experimenter nor the subjects must
know whether the drug or a placebo is being used. [d. at 125-26.
114. 102 F.T.C. 21, 126 (1983), aif'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984).
115. /d. at 312.
116. Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395, 796, aff'd, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984).
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trine. The former was applied where the Commission found an im
plied or express representation that the manufacturer had scientific
proof of the claim. For example, the claim that Anacin was superior
to other analgesics was represented to be scientifically established
because the advertisement stated that it was "medically proven."1l7
Where the advertiser made an establishment claim, the Commission
required the advertiser to have two well-controlled clinical tests sup
porting the claim. lIB
With regard to the substantial question doctrine, the Commission
identified claims for which the advertiser may have had a "reason
able basis," but for which, absent well-controlled clinical tests, there
was a "substantial question" about the truth of the claim. The ad
vertisement was deceptive if the advertiser did not inform consum
ers of this reason to doubt the advertiser's claim.
In 1983, four years after deciding American Home Products Corp. v.
FTC, the Commission decided Bristol-Myers Co., 119 which involved
the advertising of Bufferin, Excedrin, and Excedrin P.M. and Sterling
Drug, Inc.,120 which dealt with the advertising of Bayer Aspirin,
Bayer Children's Aspirin, Cope, Vanquish, and MidoL In each case,
the Commission found that some claims, such as the claim that the
product would relieve tension, were deceptive because they were
made without substantiation by a "reasonable basis."121 Moreover,
the establishment claims were deceptive because they were made
without an even higher level of substantiation, that is two well-con
trolled clinical tests. In some instances, the representation of scien
tific establishment was express, such as "scientific tests show that in
the first critical moments Bufferin delivers twice as much pain re
liever as simple aspirin."122 The Commission pointed out that it
was irrelevant that none of the advertisements actually used the
word "established."123 In some instances, the representation of sci
entific establishment was implied, such as the use of a graphic dis
play of Excedrin's chemical formula. 124 The Commission discarded
the substantial question doctrine, reasoning that it resulted in a re
117. 695 F.2d 681, 690 (3d Cir. 1982) (amended 1983).
118. !d.
ll9. 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984).
120. 102 F.T.C. 395, aff'd, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984).
121. 102 F.T.C. 21, 375, aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984).
122. Id. at 92-93.
123. Id. at 372. Other examples of establishment language are "It has been clinically
observed that ... ," "medical evidence," and claims that ingredients are "medically
endorsed." !d. at 21.
124. The Commission held that the use of the words "medically endorsed" and the
formula image imbued the ads with an aura of scientific support. [d. at 271.
Nevertheless, the Commission found that the use of glass models of people with
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quirement that the standards the Commission applied to establish
ment claims would apply to all claims.125 In other words, the
Commission feared that the substantial question doctrine blurred
the distinction between establishment claims and non-establishment
claims. 126
However, after handing down' the Bristol-Myers Co. and Sterling
Drug, Inc. decisions, the Commission adopted a new policy state
ment with regard to the advertising substantiation program. 127
That policy statement provides that advertisers will be expected to
have whatever level of support they expressly or impliedly state they
have for a particular claim. 128 .When it is not clear what level of sup
port consumers expect an advertiser to possess, the Commission
will determine the amount of substantiation to require by consider
ing "the consequences of a false claim, the benefits of a truthful
claim, the cost of developing substantiation for the claim, and the
amount of substantiation experts m the field believe IS
reasonable. "129
The most re~ent of the analgesic advertising substantiation cases
is Thompson Medical CO.,130 which involved Aspercreme, a topical
cream rub marketed as a remedy for relief from arthritis pain. In
Thompson, the substantiation doctrine was applied, according to the
Commission, in conformance with the Commission's new guide
lines. First, the Commission dealt with a number of claims that were
alleged to be deceptive. For example, the advertiser claimed that
Bufferin and aspirin tablets crumbling in the stomachs and reforming in their heads did
indicate that Bufferin's superior speed had been scientifically established.
125. /d. at 307.
126. The Commission believed that if it was considered a violation to fail to disclose a
lack of substantiation, then that was identical to requiring the substantiation.
127. SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19. At the outset the Commission stated
that advertisers must have substantiation for objective product claims. Id. at 2. Because
the Commission outlines a reasonable basis standard (divorced from consumer
expectations) later in the statement, it is not clear what relationship this introductory
paragraph has to the rest of the statement. It may be that the Commission was limiting
the entire substantiation requirement to "objective" claims, although that term is not
defined. However, it may have the unfortunate effect of removing the substantiation
requirement from claims regarding consumer satisfaction that may be equally significant
to consumers.
128. The Commission gave as examples of express claims of substantiation language
such as "tests prove," "doctors recommend," and "studies show." Of course, it is not
dear what kind of substantiation is expressly claimed by such vague language as "tests
show."
129. SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 5. Chairman Miller labeled the
consequences to consumers of false claims and the benefits of true claims as the most
important. Miller, supra note 55, at 3.
130. 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984).

28

CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Aspercreme contains aspirin and is more effective than orally in
gested aspirin.
The Commission now considers a claim deceptive only if the peti
tioner proves that the claim is "likely to mislead."I3I In Thompson,
the Commission held that there are two ways to prove "likely to mis
lead." One is to prove that the claim is not true and the other is to
prove that the claim is an objective product claim, made without a
reasonable basis. Thus, the Commission also considered the
"claim" that the advertiser had a particular level of substantiation
for the product as one of the allegedly deceptive claims. The Com
mission appeared to consider the advertising substantiation doc
trine as an aspect of its adjudication of allegations of deceptive
claims. If the Commission was finding that all objective claims are
likely to mislead if not substantiated, then the Commission was ap
plying the "substantial question" doctrine, which it rejected in Bris
tol-J.\1yers Co. 132

The Commission also considered separately allegations that
Thompson did not have a reasonable basis for claims that Asper
creme is an effective drug for the relief of arthritic pain. To deter
mine the level of substantiation to require where the advertiser has
made no claim of substantiation, the Commission held that it would
examine the same factors outlined in the policy statement. 133 After
examining the six factors, the Commission decided that two well
controlled clinical tests were required. The Commission also held
that claims could be made if approved by the FDA, although the
claims were based on less than two well-controlled clinical tests. I34
While it appears that the Commission has been shifting its stan
dards and rationales, it also appears that in advertising claims for
over-the-counter analgesics, two well-controlled clinical tests are re
quired for most product claims. Unfortunately, the cases give little
guidance concerning the amount of substantiation required for ad
vertising of other products.
B.

Standards Based on "Purposes of" Requirement

1.

Deceptive' Behavior

Questions about the amount of substantiation to require are an
swered by maintaining a focus on the two purposes of the advertis
131.

[d,

132. See supra notes 119, 121-26 and accompanying text.
133. Thompson Medical Co., 104 FTC. 648, 788 (1984).
134. The Commission refused to adopt the traditional approach of characterizing
some claims as "establishment claims." Rather, it chose to deal with those types of
claims under its discussion of deception.
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ing substantiation program suggested above, i.e., proscription of
both deceptive' and deceptiveP conduct. When viewing the program
as aimed at deceptive' behavior, the true concern of the consumer is
not whether the claim of substantiation (express or implied) is true,
but whether the claim regarding the effectiveness of the product is
true.
Given this goal of the substantiation requirement, identifying de
ceptive statements is important. It is necessary to have a test for
deception to establish a test for advertising substantiation. Unfortu
nately, the Commission has been no clearer in defining deception
than it has been in defining reasonable basis. Therefore, it is neces
sary to propose a standard for labeling deception.
a.

Difining Deception

Although the deceptive advertising mission of the Commission is
an extension of the common law actions of fraud and deceit, Con
gress intended the term "deceptive" to proscribe more conduct
than is included in traditional fraud or deceit actions. 135 Neverthe
135. See supra note 11. The following is the generally accepted definition of the tort of
deceit:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain
from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit
for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, at § 525.
With regard to the knowledge of the speaker, the tort of deceit presumably requires
that the misrepresentation be intentional. That requirement has been relaxed in a vari
ety of ways which place greater risks on the seller. The RESTATEMENT now contains the
following:
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be,
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representa
tion that he states or implies, or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that
he states or implies.
[d. at § 526 (Conditions Under Which Misrepresentation is Fraudulent Scienter). See,
e.g., Pumphey v. Quillen, 102 Ohio App. 173, 141 N.E.2d 675 (1955), aff'd, 165 Ohio St.
343, 135 N.E.2d 328 (1956).
Subsections 526 (b) and (c) reduce the difficulty ofpraving scienter. They also intro
duce a note of negligence into the scienter requirement. Although negligent misrepre
sentation technically is not covered by deceit, the making of a statement without a basis
for it can be seen as a negligent act. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 107, at 711-12
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, at § 528
("A representation that is believed to state the truth but which because of negligent
expression states what is false is a negligent but not a fraudulent misrepresentation.")
There appears to be an intentional misstatement, i.e., the misstatement of assurance in
the main statement. Because few buyers will act on a statement made equivocally, a
court likely would find any statement as one with an implied statement of confidence.

30

CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 55

less, the essential policy underlying actions in deceit and actions
against deceptive practices is the same: sellers should not be able to
induce consumers to purchase goods or services by making untrue
statements. This is a goal which goes to the heart of our economic
system, a goal that presupposes that the "market" will allocate the
production and distribution of goods and services. 136 The success
of such a system depends on the presence of accurate
information. 137
Therefore, some policy distinction must be made to determine when RESTATEMENT
§ 528 applies.
Moreover, courts have also found statements made with reckless disregard of the truth
as fraudulent. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Howle, 56 A.2d 709 (D.C. 1948) (actual knowledge
of untruthfulness of representations unnecessary); james & Gray, 111isrepresentation-Part
I, 37 MD. L. REV. 286, 298 (1977); Note, Deceit and Negligent Misrepresentation in Maryland,
35 MD. L. REV. 650 (1976). This can be interpreted as the application of a presumption
arising from the court's disbelief that the defendant really did not know that a statement
was false. "When one asserts a fact as of his own knowledge, or so positively as to imply
that he has knowledge, when he knows that he has not sufficient information to justify it,
he may be found to have the intent to deceive." Pumphrey v. Quillen, 102 Ohio App.
173, 181, 141 N.E.2d 675,681 (1955) aff'd, 165 Ohio St. 343,135 N.E.2d 328 (1956).
See Note, supra at 654. In other words, once it is demonstrated that a defendant should
have known that the statement was false, a defendant would have to prove that he actu
ally did not know it was false. Presumably, in such situations, a court would likely find
the defendant liable.
With some unevenness, courts have also adopted theories of negligent and innocent
misrepresentation. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 107, at 711-12 (4th ed.
1971); Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COL. L. REV. 679, 688-92 (1973);
Note, supra, at 654; see also Restatement, supra note 38, at § 552, § 552C. An innocent
misrepresentation might apply only where the seller is in a much better position than the
buyer to know that the statement was false. In some cases, relaxed scienter require
ments are based on the nature of the injuries suffered. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note
38, at § 402B (strict liability for harm caused to consumer purchase of goods). The law
of express warranty is also a law of innocent misrepresentation or strict liability. V.C.C.
§ 2-313 (1978). Vnder the VCC an express warranty must be part of the basis of the
bargain and many of the limitations of contract warranty law apply. See, e.g., V.C.C. § 2
313; 2-318 (1978).
136. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.
L. & ECON. 403, 492 (1981); Jordan & Rubin, supra note 64, at 532; Developments in the
Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1026 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Develvpments]. Chairman Miller stated, "Advertising simply cannot fulfill its potential in
our market system if consumers cannot rely on the truthfulness of the messages
disseminated to them. The role for the government is to engender such trust by making
sure it is warranted." Remarks of james C. Miller III, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission, Before American Advertising Federation 1,4 Gune 4, 1984); Remarks of
James C. Miller III, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Before the San Francisco
Advertising Club 6 (September 30, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Miller]. To the extent
that advertising causes consumers to purchase products they would not otherwise
purchase there is a misallocation of resources. Society would be better able to satisfy the
wants and needs of people who had accurate information.
137. Accurate information is one of the assumptions made in models of the free
market.
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There are two significant distinctions between actions in deceit
and actions against deceptive practices. The first distinction is that
deceit is concerned with a particular transaction and deception is
concerned with conduct involving many transactions. Secondly, un
like deceit, deception can involve conduct in which no one yet has
been harmed. I38 Therefore, in a deception action it is not possible
to inquire into what the seller said and intended and what the buyer
actually heard, thought, and wanted. 139 In a deceit action, the ques
tion of whether the seller's statement is true or false presents no
analytical difficulty. To determine whether the consumer's reliance
was reasonable in a deceit action, courts may be able to apply, even
if intuitively, a rational standard, such as determining which party
was better able to avoid the risk. Common law deceit jurisprudence
is not easily transferrable to deception. For example, inquiry into
the meaning of an advertisement is complicated because a single ad
vertising statement can be interpreted in different ways by many in
dividual consumers. There is no dispute as to the representation
made by those statements expressly contained in an advertisement,
but the Commission claims that many representations are implied in
an advertisement. 14o It is one thing to say that implied statements
may be actionable and another to determine what statements are
implied in an advertisement.
The Commission relies upon a variety of techniques to establish
the meaning of an advertisement. Often the Commission makes its
138. As a civil law action, one of the elements of deceit is damage. See supra note 145.
The same is true of negligent and innocent misrepresentation and warranty actions.
139. The seller's intent as well as the buyer's reliance on the seller's words are
relevant in deceit. See supra note 135.
140. As in the law of deceit, a seller can be responsible for the variety of meanings
which an advertisement may convey. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 135, at § 527. See,
e.g., Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950
(1980) (presentation of testimonials implies that typical users have same experience);
Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962) (reference in shoe
circular to physical ailments could be taken by reader to be unqualified assertions of
therapeutic worth); FTC v. Morrissey, 47 F.2d 101, 103 (7th Cir. 1931) (use of name of
fruit on label might imply that it is ingredient if clear indication of actual ingredients is
not provided). Even trade names themselves can be misleading. See, e.g., Carter Prod.,
Inc. v. FTC 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959) (ordering word
"liver" deleted from name "Carter's Little Liver Pills"); Elliot Knitware v. FTC, 266
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959); ("Cashmora" labelling on sweaters that contained no cashmere
was not deemed deceptive per se); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d
676 (2d Cir. 1944) (labeling skin cream "Rejuvenescence" implies it will rejuvenate the
skin ... or restore youth ...). The implied meanings often are referred to as deceptive
omissions. See, e.g., American Motors Corp., 100 F.T.C. 229 (1982) (deceptive omission
of information regarding Jeep's handling and maneuverability). This approach is often
expressly stated in many state deceptive practices acts. See, e.g., Md. Commercial Law
§ 13-301(3) (1983) (Supp. 1983) (must state material fact iffailure to do so is deceptive).
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own independent judgment of the meaning of an advertisement. 141
The Commission relies upon the "general impression" of an adver
tisement, rather than the literal meaning of each individual assertion
in an advertisement. 142 Sometimes dictionary definitions are
cited. 143 In other cases, the testimony of experts or consumer wit
nesses are used. 144 Increasingly, "scientific" surveys are used. 145
All of these methods demonstrate the ways in which some people
might interpret an advertisement. They are not accompanied, how
ever, by a standard for determining which interpretations are
"meanings" against which the Commission should protect. Espe
cially because advertisements are viewed independently of any anal
ysis of the intent of the advertiser,146 the issue is not what the
sender of the message was trying to say, but what the recipient un
derstood the seller to say. The "meaning" of an advertisement is,

141. See, e.g.,]. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884,886 (6th Cir. 1967). Gellhorn
refers to this as the "intuitive" or "hunch'" approach. Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer
Deception Bifore the Federal Trade Commissilfn, 17 KAN. L. REV. 559, 565 (1969). See also,
Brandt & Preston, The FTC's Use of Evidence to Determine Deception, 41]. MKTG. 54 (1971)
(although 95% of Commission's decisions are based on Commission's impression of
sales representations, Commission increasingly looks to "external" sources).
142. See, e.g., American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1983).
143. See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
144. One often-cited and particularly imaginative use of consumer testimony involved
an advertisement which stated that a hair coloring would be "permanent." A consumer
witness acknowledged that some might take the word to mean that new hair would grow
in with the artificial color after treatment but that she knew better. Gelb v. FTC, 144
F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1944). Sometimes consumer testimony is rejected. Leonard F.
Porter, Inc. 88 F.T.C. 546, 596 (1976) (a particular consumer's testimony is "not a
reliable guide to typical consumer assumptions"); Gimbel Bros., 61 F.T.C. 11051
(1962).
145. In the past, the Commission has expressed a reluctance to examine survey
results. See, e.g.,]. B. Williams Co., 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1964); Ford Motor Co., 87
F.T.C. 756, 794 (1976). But more recently the Commission has stated that where
consumer survey data is available it is "incumbent upon us ... to consider it." Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 454 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.) , ccrt. denied,
414 U.S. 1112 (1973). See also Bristol-Myers Co., 85 F.T.C. 688 (1975); ITr Continental
Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, modified, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), aff'd, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir.
1976). The Commission has recently relied upon consumer survey results in granting
requests to modify orders. See, e.g., Encydopedia Britannica, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 500
(1982); Reader's Digest Assoc., Inc., No. C-2075 (IFTC Sept. 30, 1983).
146. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967);
D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679,682 (7th Cir. 1942); Pep Boys v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158,
161 (3d Cir. 1941); Gimbel Bros. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578,579 (2d Cir. 1941). Similarly, in
state consumer protection proceedings, plaintiffs are not required to prove intent to
deceive or knowledge of the deception on the part of the business. See, e.g., Bell v. Kent
Brown Chevrolet Co., 1 Kan. App. 131,561 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. Kan. 1977); Testo v.
Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (Ct. App. Wash.
1976); Slaney v. Westwood Ave., Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768 (1975).
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therefore, created by the reader. 147 Dictionaries provide only a pre
ferred meaning for words. Surveys suggest only the number of peo
ple who attach a particular meaning to a particular statement.
Because any statement can be interpreted to have more than one
meaning, when the Commission establishes the meaning of an ad
vertisement, it actually is determining which of the many interpreta
tions of a message are "reasonable." A challenge of the
Commission's proposed meaning of an advertisement is in reality a
challenge of the desirability of protecting those people who derive
that meaning from the ad.
Another issue in Commission litigation is often articulated as the
level of consumer intelligence that is relevant in analyzing an adver
tisement. A number of phrases have been used to indicate that ad
vertisements must be judged by the standard of their ability to
deceive not just intelligent consumers, but also the less acute. A
sampling of the phrases used includes the expressions of intent to
protect "the trusting as well as the suspicious," 148 "the average indi
vidual,"149 the "buying public,"150 and the "ignorant, the unthink
ing, and the credulous."151 Nevertheless, the Commission rec
ognizes that there must be some lower limits on the consumer "in
telligence" to be protected. In one case, the Commission stated
that, "An advertiser cannot be charged with liability in respect of
every conceivable misconception, however outlandish, to which his
representations might be subjected among the foolish or feeble
147. "[E]ven the literal meaning of a sentence is at bottom a matter of semantic
convention, and it could certainly be argued that the meaning of a sentence (and of its
surrounding context) can be defined only by reference to what its audience takes it to
mean." Beales, supra note 136, at 497.
148. See, e.g., Gelb v. JTTC, 144 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1944); Giant Food, Inc., 61
F.T.C. 326, 346 (1962).
149. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941); American Horne
Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 689 (3d Cir. 1983) (It is not necessary to read
advertisements in such a way to "preclude the Commission from taking action against
advertisements that, when read with scrupulous care by vigilant and literal minded
consumers, could be seen to be making true claims.").
150. See, e.g., Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956).
151. See, e.g., Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2rl 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961) ("The
Commission should look not to the most sophisticated reader, but rather to the least.");
Aronberg v. l'TC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1943); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302
U.S. 112, 116 (1937); see also Parker Pen Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1946)
("Commission's duty is to protect the casual, one might say the negligent, reader, as
well as the vigilant and more intelligent discerning public"); General Motors Corp. v.
FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940) ("It may be that there was no intention to mislead
and that only the careless or the incompetent could be misled. But if the Commission,
having discretion to deal with these matters, thinks it best to insist upon a form of
advertising clear enough so that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah, 'wayfaring men,
though fools, shall not err herein,' it is not for the courts to revise their judgment.").
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minded."152 There are a number of other ways of articulating the
standard. For example, the Commission has held that many claims
are puffing. I53
Despite attempts to indicate that there is some lower limit to
Commission protection, the Commission has protected particularly
vulnerable groups. 154 Unfortunately, neither the general statements
with regard to consumer intelligence, nor the vulnerable group pol
icy, suggest a clear standard for determining whether an advertise
ment is deceptive. The general statements do not contain any clue
as to the policy considerations that would guide such a determina
tion. Stating the policy in terms of attacking advertisements which
deceive "vulnerable" groups does not provide a solution to the
problem of identifying those situations where Commission interven
tion is appropriate, because a single person deceived by a particular
advertisement would be a vulnerable group of one. Moreover, the
Commission would still have to determine how many members of an
identified vulnerable group must be deceived to warrant a conclu
sion that an advertisement is deceptive.
The problem is that some people probably interpret an advertise
ment to make a representation about a product and this representa
tion is not true. Some people are fooled by the advertisement and
some of them buy the product. The issue is how to determine
whether that some deserve government intervention. Is5

152. See, e.g., FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 676 (2d cir. 1963) (no violation
if ordinary reader, to be misled, must have "not only a careless and imperceptive mind
but also a propensity for unbounded flights of fancy").
153. See, e.g., Kidder Oil Co. v. FTC, 117 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1941) (claims that product
is "perfect" and enables car to go an "amazing distance" are puffing); Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 55 F.T.C. 354, 368 (1958) (statements that cigarette was "milder" and
"soothing" were not puffing; Commission did not indicate whether pun was intended).
The Commission also must demonstrate the materiality of the statement. This
materiality usually can be an aspect of the requirement for causation. The United States
Supreme Court has defined deception as the "misrepresentation of any fact so long as it
materially induces a purchaser'S decision to buy." FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374, 387 (1965) (emphasis added). In FTCA cases as in tort, materiality more often
is considered as an element of the reasonableness of the reliance. See, e.g., James &
Gray, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 MD. L. REV. 488, 493 (1978).
154. See, e.g., Hudson Pharmaceutical Corp., 89 F.T.C. 82, 86 (1977) (using
Spiderman to advertise vitamins); Tri-State Driver Training, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 417 (1976)
(deceiving unemployed by promising jobs).
155. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 136, at 495-96 ("[T]he legal definition of
deception does not require any such stopping place, nor does it offer any principles to
suggest where a good stopping place would be.") The authors point out that under
existing definitions of deception "every advertisement in the country [is] potentially
deceptive." /d. at 495.
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A number of proposals have been made to use empirical research
to make these judgments. 156 Ernest Gellhorn has proposed that
whenever there is a dispute regarding the interpretation of an ad
vertisement the Commission should request that independent
surveys resolve the issue. 157 The surveys should indicate not only
the number of people deceived, but also the significance of the de
ception. 158 Gellhorn recognizes problems with deciding what to do
with the statistics once they are gathered. He rejects establishing per
se rules, such as that an advertisement is actionable if more than
14% of the people are deceived, because, "The scope and signifi
cance of the hann should affect the level at which the threshold of
prohibited deception is established."159 He suggests that when
there is possible health or safety harm, an advertisement is actiona
ble if 1% or 2% (not more than 5%) of the people are deceived;
when there is only economic harm, 10% or 15% deception is tolera
ble. 160 Unfortunately, he does not reveal how he arrived at those
particular figures. 161
The failure to recognize the need for a workable standard by
which to evaluate empirical research appears in other similar pro
posals as well. 162 When reaching the question of how to evaluate
156. Chairman Miller was anxious to see empirical research used in Commission
decision making. See Miller, supra note 136. The Commission, beginning with the
studies to determine the residual effects of Listerine advertising, showed an interest in
belief-based measures to judge the level of deception. Armstrong, Gurol & Russ,
Defining and Measuring Deception, in ADVERTISING: A REVIEW AND EVALUATION IN CURRENT
ISSUES AND RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING: 198028 (J. Leigh & R. Martin eds. 1980). The
Commission recently used survey evidence presented by the Reader's Digest to modify
its order prohibiting the publisher from including in sweepstake's promotions
"simulated checks, currency ... [or] any confusingly simulated item of value. Reader's
Digest Assoc., 102 F.T.C. 1268 (1983). The Digest presented the results of an elaborate
survey in which interviewers traveled door to door to observe recipients impressions to
the advertising pieces. Request to Reopen and Modify Consent Order, Reader's Digest
Assoc., 102 F.T.C. 1268 (1983).
157. Gellhom, supra note 141, at 567-72.
158. Id. at 571.
159. [d.
160. [d. at 572.
161. To be fair, it must be conceded that he uses the figures only as examples. But he
fails to provide the standard by which real figures should be derived.
In one case where there were surveys indicating that at least 15.3% of the "tire
purchasers" were deceived by an advertisement which involved "safety" claims, the
Commission indicated that the deception was not actionable. Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398,453-55 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), art. denied, 414
U.S. 1112 (1973). Rather than accept the survey findings the Commission went to great
length to discredit them, thus indicating that the scope of deception demonstrated by
the survey did not seem impressive.
162. Commissioners often have advocated the use of advertising copy tests without
explaining what standards would be used to evaluate the results of such tests. See, e.g.,
the testimony of Commissioner Clanton. Hearings, supra note 94, at 84. For example,
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the research, writers suggest that the Commission must determine
the appropriate consumer intelligence level. 163 The difficulty with
that approach is that the use of behavior research is advocated be
cause such standards as "intelligence level" provide little guidance.
There is no basis on which to arbitrarily select a percentage for mis
leadingness. Although the Commission has used survey research
data,164 it has never articulated a reason for finding that where a
particular percentage of consumers interpret an advertisement in a
particular way, the advertisement is or is not deceptive. 165
The Commission has attempted to promulgate a more workable
definition of deception. In 1982, Commission Chairman Miller pro
posed to Congress that Section 5 be amended to include the
following:
A deceptive act or practice is a material representation that:
(a) Is likely to mislead consumers, acting reasonably in
the circumstances, to their detriment; or
Comment, supra note 106, suggests use of behavioral research to evaluate advertising.
But the writer never explains how the behavioral research is to be used. Another writer
suggests that the Commission not be concerned with how consumers might interpret an
advertisement, but how they do interpret it. Pollay, Deceptive Advertising and Consumer
Behavior: A Case/or Legislative and Judicial Reform, 17 KANS. L. REV. 625 (1969). Pollay
suggests the use of rigorous research methodologies, but he recognizes that a judgment
must be made in evaluating the research. Id. at 637. See Armstrong, supra note 156, at
33 (there is no simple answer to question of how much deception we will tolerate). One
FTC Commissioner expressed the view that the appropriate standard was that the
amount of harm would be greater than the cost of Commission enforcement.
Thompson, Memorandum to the Federal Trade Commission, (available in 7 ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. REV. 27 (1974-75».
In modifYing the Reader's Digest Order, (see supra note 156) the Commission not only
did not question the validity of using door to door interviews to determine consumer
reaction to a mailing piece but also did not attempt to translate the Digest's statistics
into a quantity of harm resulting from deception.
163. See, e.g., Mann & Gurol, An Objective Approach to Detecting and Correcting Deceptive
Advertising, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 73 (1978). Mann & Gurol conducted a survey to
establish the ability to determine deception, but could say only that the deception score
should be measured for the "relevant group," meaning the proper "intelligence level,"
and that the Commission must establish a threshold score for various products and
categories, beyond which an advertisement is considered deceptive. The writers suggest
that the threshold score should be based on the scope and significance of the possible
harm. !d. at 100 & n.160.
164. See, e.g., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 500 (1982) (consent order
which appears to tolerate deception at level of 25%); Bristol-Myers Co., 85 F.T.C. 688,
745 (1975) (2-4% held to be "patently insubstantial"); I.T.T. Continental Banking Co.,
83 F.T.C. 865 (1973) (10-14% is deceptive); In re RJR Foods, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 7 (1973)
(consent order which appears to tolerate deception at level of 5%); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 461-62 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.) , cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1112 (1973) (1.4% not deceptive, 14% is deceptive); Benrus Watch Co., 64 F.T.C.
1018, 1032 (1964) (14% is deceptive); Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 49 F.T.C. 263 (1952)
(9% is deceptive).
165. See supra note 162.
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(b) the representor knew or should have known would be
misleading. 166
Congress refused to adopt that change. On October 14, 1983, the
Commission announced a very similar enforcement policy statement
with regard to deceptive acts or practices. I67 It stated that, "the
FTC will find deception if there is a representation, omission or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in
the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment."168 The statement
is defended by the majority of the Commission as nothing more
than a restatement and synthesis of prior law. I69 Two members of
the Commission view it as an attempt to limit the Commission's abil
ity to protect consumers.I70
There are two aspects of the statement which appear to be signifi
canLI7I The first is the requirement that only consumers acting rea
166. See Letter from James C. Miller III to the Honorable Robert Packwood (October
14, 1983) (Attached dissenting statement of Commissioner M. Pertschuk at 4)
[hereinafter cited as Miller Letter]. The Chairman revived the proposal in 1983.
Hearings, supra note 94, at 6.
167. Miller Letter, supra note 166.
168. !d. at 4.
169. !d. at 2; Federal Trade Commission Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Transportation, and Tourism ofthe House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984) (Prepared Statement of James C. Miller III, Chairman FTC at 9) [hereinafter
cited as Miller Statement].
170. Letter from P. Bailey & M. Pertschuk to the Hon.John D. Dingell (Feb. 28, 1984)
(attached analysis of deception) [hereinafter cited as Bailey]. Their objections were
included later in a law review article. The National Association of Attorneys General
opposed the Commission's proposed amendment of § 5 because many state statutes
require following Commission interpretations of the FTCA when interpreting state
consumer protection acts. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, RESOLUTIONS AT
ANNUAL MEETING, MACKINAC ISLAND, MICHIGAN II (July 15-18, 1982). Many state
consumer protection statutes include provisions stating that the legislature intended
that in construing the act the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the
Commission and the Federal Courts to Section 5(a)(J) of the FTCA. See Federal Trade
Commission Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Prepared statement
ofJohn T. Montgomery, Chief of Mass. Consumer Protection at 6) [hereinafter cited as
Montgomery]. The chairman of the House Subcommittee on Commerce,
Transportation, and Tourism also strongly opposed the statement. Florio Assails New
F T.G. Policy on Ads, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, at 29, col. 1.
171. Actually the statement is divided into three parts:
L There must be a representation, omission, or practice, that is likely to
mislead the consumer. Miller Letter, supra note 166, at 4.
II. The Act or Practice Must Be Considered From the Perspective of the
Reasonable Consumer. [d. at 7.
III. The Representation, Omission or Practice must be Material. [d. at
15 (Note that the above have been renumbered for purposes of this
discussion. In the original statement, roman numeral I is introductory.)
The conclusion that the words "likely to mislead" refer to materiality is based on the
fact that in the section dealing with Part I, the Commission only outlines the kinds of
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sonably be protected. The Commission thinks that this formulation
of words more clearly sets the standard for the types of misrepre
sentations that are actionable, while the minority thinks that phrases
such as protecting the "trusting as well as the suspicious" are
clearer statements of what is actionable. 172 The Commission con
siders a "reasonable" interpretation of an advertisement to be one
shared by a "significant and representative segment of the popula
tion exposed to the claim." 173 According to the Chairman, the rea
sonable consumer standard "simply requires that we interpret ads
as ordinary consumers dO."174 He states that the Commission con
sciously rejected a standard based on a "substantial number" of
consumers being misled, because it is not clear how many consum
practices which may be actionable (e.g., affirmative misrepresentations, omissions, bait
and switch) and does not deal with the meaning of the word "likely" or how we would
determine likeliness. !d. at 4-7. However, in Part III, the Commission states that "A
material misrepresentation or practice is one which is likely to affect a consumer's choice
of ... a product." !d. at 15-16 (emphasis added). See alsQ id. at attached concurring
statement of Commissioner George W. Douglas. In his prepared remarks before the
House Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism. Chairman Miller re
fers to "likely" as a substitute for "tendency or'capacity." He sees both as differing from
a requirement of finding "actual deception to conclude that a violation of section 5 has
occurred." Miller Statement, supra note 169, at 9. Further, the Commission equates
materiality with damages: "[J]njury and materiality are different names for the same con
cept." Miller Letter, supra note 166, at 19. This is somewhat ofa deviation from tradi
tional tort analysis in which materiality is an aspect of causation and could exist without
actual injury. The Commission's analysis would be satisfactory if the Commission would
accept that whenever consumers buy a product based on inaccurate information (and
that inaccurate information was material to their decision), the Commission would con
sider the misstatement actionable. In fact, the Commission would require some showing
of a significant public harm (e.g., a substantial number of people buying a product worth
$1.00 for $2.00) and would not act where there was no such harm (e.g., even if a sub
stantial number of people bought a product because it believed that a celebrity endorser
used the product where the product was in fact worth the price and did what it claimed
to do). Moreover, deception requires harm sufficient to warrant public intervention. All
three concepts (the reasonableness of the consumer, the materiality of the claim, and the
amount of damage) are ways of approaching the same question: how much consumer
purchasing under a misapprehension is tolerable before the claim is actionable (or when
are we going to assign the risk of consumer purchases under a misapprehension to the
seller and when to the buyer)?
172. See, e.g., Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1944).
173. See Miller Statement, supra note 169, at 9, 10. The use of the word
"representative" is puzzling. In Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d
751 (2d CiL 1963), the Commission said that "A representation does not become 'false
and deceptive' merely because it will be unreasonably understood by an insigificant and
unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is
addressed." Presumably this means that if a sample of the population is chosen the
sample should be representative of the total population.
174. Miller Statement, supra note 169, at 10. He rejects the idea that using a
"reasonableness" standard denies protection to unsophisiticated or gullible consumers
by repeating that "it simply requires that the Commission interpret claims as people
ordinarily do." Id.
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ers constitute a substantial number and because such a standard
would prevent protection of even a few people misled by "the most
blatant fraud."
However, "substantial" is no more indeterminate than "reason
able." Like the concept of "substantial number,"175 the term "rea
sonable" is indeterminate and can be given meaning only in
application. 176
The second significant aspect of the statement involves the need
for a finding of materiality. The words "likely to mislead" and "to
the consumer's detriment" are intended to convey some rigor in
connecting the "misstatement" with some harm. The Commission
believes that the word "likely" is a replacement for language to the
effect that a finding of only a "tendency to mislead" is sufficient.
The Commission thinks that the words "tendency to deceive" or
"capacity to deceive" are "incantations" and tautological, while
"likely to mislead" is more informative. Whether the Commission
believes that the use of this language would have led to a different
result in past cases is not clear. In other words, the Commission has
175. The tenn substantial at least has the advantage of coming closer to expressing a
policy of governmental interference where the benefits of such interference (the amount
of harm prevented) exceed the cost. Therefore, use of the word "substantial" would be
more consistent with the commission majority's expressed goal.
176. Mark Silbergeld, director of the Consumers' Union Washington office, stated
that:
To say that the Commission must make a detennination on what a
reasonable consumer in the circumstances would do leaves the person
who is looking for guidance as to whether a particular ad is deceptive ...
just as unclear as he or she may be under the body of existing case law.
Hearings, supra note 94, at 198.
Although the common law speaks in tenns of "reasonableness" of reliance, that word
is used as an indication that the trier of fact (traditionally the jury) should determine
whether the statement is actionable. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. PROS
SER, supra note 135, at § 37. The Commission Consumer Protection Division speaks of
"reasonableness" as "an ancient and honorable legal doctrine . ..." MEMORANDUM, supra
note 61, at 11 (emphasis added). In fact, both the Commission and the dissenters articu
late goals which lead to some sort of economic cost benefit analysis.
This writer believes that the debate is political, not leg-al. The Commission has made
a priori judgments regarding costs and benefits of particular rules without testing them.
It then has decided that past advertising regulation is inefficient. The Commission also
has made the kinds of value judgments discussed earlier and has decided that particular
groups no longer warrant protection. It may be that the Commission's use of the word
"reasonable" as a label for the results it reaches in deception cases is a political device to
defend a change in the Commission's direction while placing opponents in the unenvi
able position of claiming to favor an "unreasonable."
The majority may fear that the word "reasonable" will imply that the Commission will
proceed only where a successful tort action could be supported. Where there are very
subtle implied claims or where the individual loss is quite small, a tort action would have
been unlikely.
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not demonstrated how it would apply the word "likely" to specific
cases which were disposed of under the "tendency" standard.
The use of the words "likely" and "reasonable" may in fact have
connotations which result in a higher standard. 177 The troublesome
aspect of the Commission's statement and the minority's objection
is not the use of the word "reasonable,"178 it is that both avoid a
more rational approach to deceptive advertising cases. Despite the
progress that has been made in the social sciences in understanding
advertising, and despite the Chairman's own stated preference for
the use of empirical research in deception cases,179 the Commission
appears to be merely substituting one indeterminate word for an
other, rather than attempting to establish the levels of certainty re
quired and the procedure for revealing and weighing the value
choices necessary to label conduct deceptive. I80
However, Commission findings of deception appropriately may
be tied to a cost benefit analysis. Such an analysis promotes the goal
of economic efficiency in the regulation of advertising. In fact, it
appears that both the Commission majority and its dissenters are
supportive of this goal.1 81 Economic-analysis suggests that govern
177. Although the Commission now says that the policy statement is just a
restatement of prior law, the policy statement is based on a Bureau of Consumer
Protection memorandum in which it is indicated that this is a new standard which would
lead to a different result in a significant number of cases. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, MEMORANDUM DEFINING DECEPTION 3-6, 27-29 (undated).
The Commission minority oqjected to the use of the "likely" to mislead language
because it "may hamstring the Commission in preventing injury that had not yet
occurred" and introduce complex evidentiary problems in stopping even clearly
misleading advertisements.
Apparently the use of "likely" is a change from a planned requirement for "actual"
injury, but Commissioner Pertshchuk believes it will lead to the same result. See Miller
Hearings, supra note 94, attached dissenting statement of Commissioner M. Pertschuk,
at 7. The chief of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Division believes that the
Commission's language serves to alter the burden of proof on the issue of materiality.
Montgomery, supra note 170, at 15.
Miller Hearings, sujrra note 94, attached dissenting statement of Commissioner M.
Pertschuk, at 6.
178. In fact, in outlining the unfairness standard, the Commissioner under Pertschuk
chairmanship used the word "reasonable." Letter of the FTC to Senators Wendell Ford
and John Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in FTC Act Amendments and Autiwrization,
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 598, at 37 (May 31, 1983).
179. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 136, at 6.
180. To speak of degrees of determinancy would be more accurate. It has been often
demonstrated that no legal rule is determinate. See Singer, The Player and the Cards:
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L. REV. 1, 14-19 (1984).
181. There is reason to believe that the Commission originally had some sort of cost
benefit analysis in mind in the use of the reasonableness standard. Hearings, supra note
94, at 10. For example, Commissioner Douglas stated that, "The purpose of the
reasonable consumer standard is simply to ensure that the Commission does not
prevent most consumers from hearing useful information ...." Miller Letter, supra note
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ment intervention is necessary only where the market itself is unable
to yield "efficient" results. 182 At a later point in this article, it will be
demonstrated that efficiency is not necessarily the only legitimate
goal of government. However, as a point of departure, it will be
helpful to begin by considering the effect of deceptive advertising
and Commission regulation in terms of the value of economic effi
ciency. From a societal viewpoint, to the extent that advertising
causes consumers to purchase products they would not otherwise
purchase, there is a misallocation of resources. The society would
satisfy better the wants and needs of consumers who had accurate
information. However, if the goal is "efficiency" (i.e., reducing mis
allocation of resources), that efficiency is denied only if avoiding the
consumer's mistake costs less than the mistake itself. Therefore, ef
ficiency occurs when the party who can avoid the purchase under a
166, attached statement of Commissioner George W. Douglas, at 2 (without it members
of Commission could block useful ads at their whim).
This suggests an intent on the part of the Commission to consider the cost of the
regulation. Also, the Commission's statement is based on a memorandum by the
Bureau of Consumer Protection which advocates that the Commission should pursue
only "reasonable" constructions of advertising which would operate "efficiently."
MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 11. Mr. Timothy Muris, the Director of the Bureau of
Consumer Protection at the time the memorandum was prepared and its presumed
author, has stated that, "Our guiding principles are based on economics...." Remarks
of Timothy J. Muris Before the National Association of Manufacturers (March 10, 1983).
Although the Commission statement is couched in language to indicate that it is not a
deviation from past Commission policy, the tests for deception, particularly the use of
the words "reasonable" and "likely," are the same as those set forth in the
memorandum which acknowledges itself to be a correction of past abuses.
In that memorandum advertising regulation is discussed in terms of the costs and
benefits of restricting information. MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 10. As indicated
above, members of the Commission objected strenuously to the new policy statement.
See Miller Letter, supra note 166, attached dissenting statement of Commissioner M.
Pertschuk; Bailey, supm note 170. They preferred that the Commission determine
whether a substantial number of consumers are misled regardless of whether they are
acting "reasonably." Bailey, supra note 170, at 37-52. The dissenters argument appears
to be closer to an empirical standard. That is, rather than make a judgment regarding
how sensibly people being misled are behaving, the seller should be responsible for a
significant amount of misapprehension caused by the advertisement. Suprisingly
enough, then, the dissenters are closer to articulating an economic standard than the
majority. When we realize that the majority had an economic standard in mind when it
used the word "reasonable," it becomes unclear just what the dispute is all about.
It is argued that the use of the word "reasonable" in tort may represent an economic
standard. See, e.g., POSNER, infra note 182, at 125.
182. Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's
Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1663, 1665 (1974). Efficiency is defined
as exploiting resources in a way that yields maximum value. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw (2d ed. 1977). See Veljanovski, The Economic Approach to Law: A Critical
Introduction, 7 BRIT. J. L. & SOC'Y 158, 169 (1980) ("This departure from the ideal
outcome of the perfectly competitive market is referred to as market failure and is a
necessary efficiency condition for legal intervention.").
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misapprehension at the least cost is made liable for the harm caused
by that purchase. 183 The law should "mimic" the market, by as
signing the risk of loss to the party who can avoid the loss at the
least COSt.1 84
For the balance of this article, it will be assumed that the costs of
the policy decision to prevent some form of advertising conduct
should be based on the amount the victims of the policy lose as a
result of the policy's enactment and that the benefits should be de
termined by the amount the beneficiaries gain. 185 "Victims" of a
policy can include advertisers as well as consumers who do not ben
efit from the policy. "Beneficiaries" are the consumers who would
have purchased a product or service but for the policy.
The cost to the consumer of avoiding the harm might be spending
a few minutes at the store examining the product. It could also in
volve seeking information from other sources. Obtaining access to
some sources may involve significant costs. Obtaining access to
other sources, such as Consumer Reports, may be less costly.186 The
183. Polinsky, supra note 182, at 1663. The buyer is made "liable" if he is given no
remedy. The rule as stated can be interpreted to protect less sophisticated consumers
because they would have to go to an extremely high expense to protect against the risk.
They, therefore, would be less likely to be the cheapest cost avoider. The rule as stated
is the rule proposed for unintentional torts. It is derived by applying the "Learned
Hand formula" (i.e., the defendant is guilty of negligence if the loss caused by the
accident, multiplied by the probability of the accident's occurring, exceeds the burden of
the precautions that the defendants might have taken to avert it) to both the defendant
and plaintiff (i.e., contributory or comparative negligence). See POSNER, supra note 182,
at 122-24.
184. Polinsky, supra note 182, at 1657.
185. This analysis is based on an analysis by Professor Markovitz. See Markovitz,
Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1169 (1984). There is some dispute as to how to measure costs and benefits.
Kennedy, Cost Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A CritiljW!, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387
(1981). This has been discussed as the "offer/ask problem" in regard to arriving at the
proper formula. For example, to measure costs one could compute the amount
necessary to pay the losers (victims) for implementation of the policy (the amount that
would be offered) or the amount that the victims would pay to prevent implementation
of the policy (the amount they would ask to pay). As indicated in the text Professor
Markovitz argues that the former is appropriate because the "offer" amount, if given,
would put the losers back to the status· quo. With regard to the beneficiaries of the
policy, the "ask" amount would be the amount they would request to reject the policy
and the "offer" amount would be what they would be willing to pay for implementation
of the policy. Professor Markovitz endorses the "offer" amount for the above reason.
The benefit of this rule is, therefore, often equal to the costs of the practice being
prevented. If consumers' losses of $1 ,000 are prevented by the rule, that is a benefit of
the rule. Of course, one of the costs of the rules could be benefits of the practice that is
being regulated. If the rule causes information to be denied to consumers and results
thereby in certain consumers losing the benefits of the product, that is a cost of the rule.
186. When we say that a consumer could not avoid the harm, we probably mean that
for some consumers to avoid the harm would require an exorbitant expense, e.g., going
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cost to the advertiser of avoiding the harm might be to alter his ad
vertising in such a way that it fails to inform some customers of the
product's availability or to create lengthier and more expensive ad
vertisements. Government regulation of advertising is appropriate
where the type of deception is more efficiently avoided by sellers.
The harm that the Commission seeks to avoid results from a con
sumer purchasing a product under some misapprehension. If an ad
vertisement suggests that a product will provide a particular benefit,
which in fact it will not, a consumer who believes the advertisement
and purchases the product suffers harm.
Even when individual transactions in which the market does not
provide an "efficient" result can be identified, government interven
tion can be governed by an efficiency standard, i.e., public resources
should not be misallocated. 187 Thus, government intervention is
not appropriate unless it is "efficient." The benefits of the interven
tion must outweigh the costs of the intervention. This has been rec
ognized as the appropriate standard in the passing comments of
various writers. 188 The costs of regulation (where that action is an
Commission order to cease and desist) include the actual costs of
the government investigation and prosecution of the action. It also
must include the costs of the respondent'S defense, because our
concern is with the total amount of resources consumed by society
in preventing the practice. 18g Another cost is the extent to which
back to school to learn how to read better. That might explain protection for
"vulnerable people." Concern that this standard would lead to governmental
intervention in too many situations is dealt with by limiting Commission action to those
situations where it is warranted by the costs to society. It could also describe situations
where most consumers could avoid a particular harm only by going to exorbitant
expense. e.g., having a lawyer or engineer with them.
187. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47. 63 (1969). See
Veljanovski, supra note 182, at 169 ("It is not a sufficient condition because the costs of
intervention, both direct and as a consequence of other misallocations it gives rise to,
may outweigh any efficiency gains.")
188. For example in Developments, supra note 136, at 1042, the writer states that a
" 'lowest intelligence' standard ... seems appropriate if the few who might be deceived
can be protected without significant intrusion on the interests of the advertiser and the
undeceived majority of the public." See also Pollay, supra note 162, at 637 ("The final
judgment will eventually be the difficult problem of striking a balance betwen the
potential social cost resulting from misperceptions of some consumers and potential
social gain resulting from effective undistorted communication of information from the
advertiser to the balance ofthe consumers."). Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 146,
at 501, suggest that "an advertisement is deceptive ifit fails to disclose the information
that would be optimal under the circumstances. Optimality is based on a cost benefit
analysis of requiring additional information." This is a basis, however, for designing
strategies for requiring additional information in advertisements. [d.
189. In fact, when there is a final cease and desist order, its costs must include a pro
rata share of all cease and desist investigations which do not culminate in cease and
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the government prevents advertisers from conveying useful infor
mation to consumers. 190 It should be emphasized that our society is
concerned with not just the cost of preventing the particular adver
tiser who is the subject of a particular cease and desist order from
conveying a particular piece of information, but the cost of prevent
ing all advertisers from conveying information as a result of the gov
ernment's determination of the level by which all advertising will be
judged. On one level, the cost of preventing advertisers from con
veying useful information might be relatively easy to calculate. The
consent order in Reader's Digest Association stated that Reader's Digest
could not use any simulated item of value in sweepstakes promo
tions. 191 Therefore, a cost of the order would be application of that
rule to other sweepstakes promotions.l 92 However, it may be neces
sary to abstract cease and desist orders to a higher level. For exam
ple, if the Commission says that an advertiser's action is deceptive
because 12% of the consumers are misled, the cost is banning all
advertisements that reach that level.
The benefit of the rule calculates the total harm caused by the
prohibited practices. The harm incl~des not just the cost of prod
ucts purchased that would not have been purchased but for the de
ceptive advertisement but additional harm caused as well. This
explains Professor Gellhorn's proposal that a lower level of decep
tion should be actionable where health and safety claims are in
volved. 193 Presumably, physical injury caused by a tire not
performing as promised at high speed can lead to exceptionally high
costs. But that may not be true for all "health" claims. Where a sun
burn ointment does not stop sun burn "pain" as fast as expected the
costs may not be so high. Therefore, the health and safety concept
may be good as a guide but not as a rule.l 94 The concept of a cost
desist orders as well as a pro rata share of all successful respondent's expenses for
lawyering which forestall cease and desist orders.
190. See infra notes 230-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of this type of
cost.
191. Reader's Digest Assoc., 79 F.T.C. 696 (1971).
192. The rules were not applied to other sweepstakes' promotions, which was one of
Reader's Digest's grounds for complaining. See infra note 224. See, e.g., Request to
Reopen and Modify Consent Order, Exhibit D, Reader's Digest Assoc., Inc., No. C-2075
(FTC Sept. 30,1983) (demonstrating the many other sweepstakes which used simulated
items of value). For purposes of determining the value of a particular rule some
rationality in the process must be assumed, i.e., the same rule will be applied to all
similarly situated.
193. See Gellhorn, supra note 141 at 572.
194. The distinction between personal injury and economic loss is often made in
consumer protection law. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279
(Alaska 1976); V.C.C. §§ 2-318 (Alternatives A & B), 2-719(3) (1978); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 38, at § 402A.
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benefit analysis, explains why lower levels of deception should not
be actionable. Using a Commission example, the number of people
who believe that Danish Pastry is made in Denmark is probably few
enough that the harm is extremely slight. 195 The costs of correcting
that misapprehension may not be warranted by the benefits. Placing
a small notice "Not Made In Denmark" probably would not help
many of those people who are deceived and prohibiting the use of
the term Danish Pastry entirely would confuse large numbers of
people seeking the item. A decision to relate Commission action to
such an analysis would help rationalize Commission decisions. For
example, the empirical research that estimates the number of con
sumers misled by an advertisement would be useful in determining
the benefits of restricting the advertising message. Such a policy
does away with the need for such moralistic and indeterminate
words as "reasonable." Moreover, it relates to one of the purposes
of Commission advertising regulation: protecting the integrity of
the marketplace. To the extent that the goal is economic an eco
nomic standard is appropriate.
Economic analysis accepts achieving "efficiency" as an appropri
ate goal for public policy. Such a policy, however, does not affect
the relative allocation of resources in society .196 Yet it is a legiti
mate goal for government to reallocate resources from the most for
tunate to the less fortunate. This is an obvious goal of poverty
programs that make no pretense of doing anything beside providing
money or goods and services to people based on the recipient's low
income. 197

195. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964).
196. P. BURROWS & C. VELJANOVSKI, THE ECONOMIC ApPROACH TO LAw 12 (1981)
"The desirability of efficiency as a goal thus requires a value judgment as to the justness
of the underlying distribution of income and property rights. .. [E]fficiency itself is not
such a 'momentous achievement from the point of view of social welfare. A person who
starts off ill-endowed may stay poor and deprived .. .''' One writer demonstrates that
the wealth maximization goal of efficiency is "biased against the poor and in favor of the
wealthy." Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect A Bigger Slice? 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 67l, 678 (1980). See Posner, Utilitarianism, Ecanomics, and Legal Theory, 8
J. LEGAL STUDIES 103, 108, 109 (1979) (economic analysis can be seen as "a theory the
law seeks to optimize the use and exchange of whatever rights people start out with").
197. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-l (West 1983) (prevention and correction of
dependency and delinquency among children should be accomplished so far as
practicable through welfare services which will seek to continue living of such children in
their own homes.); Food Stamp Program, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982) ("To alleviate ...
hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorized which will permit
low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of
trade by increasing food purchasing power for all eligible households who apply for
participation. ").
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It may be a legitimate question whether even government regula
tion of advertising could find a justification in reallocation of re
sources. Many economists believe that where there is a contractual
or market relationship it may be difficult or impossible to use the
legal system to redistribute income, since raising the standard of
performance for sellers will mean higher costs for consumers.198
But this observation treats sellers and buyers each as a single class.
It may, however, be desirable to protect some buyers at the expense
of other buyers. Thus a legal rule that protects the gullible by sav
ing them $1,000 may cost other consumers $2,000. But if we con
cluded that the gullible were poor or otherwise disadvantaged, we
may decide for policy reasons that it is worth the cost. Efficiency is
just one of many potential values that society may choose to further
through governmental intervention.
The public does not necessarily judge the wisdom of governmen
tal activity strictly on the basis of economics or wealth maximization,
even though they may make many personal decisions on that ba
199 People are often willing to sacrifice for society in general or
SiS.
for disadvantaged groups in society when they can be sure that
others in society are doing their share. For example, one writer is
puzzled by the fact that he favors government policies for conserva
tion and protection of the environment but he drives a car that leaks
oil. He instinctively realizes that a small effort on his part will have
little impact but he is willing to pay for the environment if it is part
of a significant societal effort. Therefore, he would favor laws that
make his wasteful conduct illega1. 200
The poor as a group are particularly susceptible to advertising
claims.201 Costly, higher standards of honesty in advertising may be
a particularly effective way of helping those who began life at a sig
nificant disadvantage. 202 Helping the disadvantaged by raising ad
198. A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 109 (1983). The legal
system is redistributing income if one group in society must go to some extra expense so
that another group is not deceived. There is, then, an indirect transfer. One group is
paying to educate another.
199. Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions Are Not All
Economic, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 286 (1981).
200. Id.
201. J. HOWARD & J. HULBERT, ADVERTISING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A STAFF
REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 34 (1973).
202. !d. at 35 (poor and disadvantaged have special information needs are not
currently well met). Professor Arthur H. Travers, Jr. has noted that current interest in
consumer affairs has coincided with the development of a national concern with the
persistence of poverty in America. Travers, Forward, 17 RAN. L. REV. 551, 553 (1969).
"[S]tudies have shown that a disproportionate number of the victims of consumer frauds
have been the sick and the old and the poor." Id. at 555.
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vertising standards assists them in a more helpful manner than just
transferring money.203
The above discussion refers to the use of government regulation
to reallocate resources in order to alleviate some of the imbalances
in society. This deals with disadvantages that actually exist. Another
value that consumer protection promotes is the perception of fairness
on the part of citizens with regard to the economic and politIcal in
stitutions of society. That perception is an important aspect of the
glue that holds society together. Although not necessarily identifi
able in cost benefit terms, the appearance of fairness may be an im
portant value to pursue. 204
The above discussion helps to highlight the difference between
economic analysis itself205 and efficiency goals in the advertising
regulation context. 206 Even if we do not always accept the norma
tive goal of efficiency the analysis will be helpfuL The economic
analysis requires the Commission to be as precise as possible re
garding the costs and benefits of proposed regulation. 207 Since the
regulation of advertising involves regulation of business marketing
where most of the benefits and costs are monetary in nature, eco
nomic analysis is more valuable than in areas where it is more diffi
cult to quantify in monetary terms. But even where the costs of
regulation exceed the benefits, a thorough analysis will reveal other
values to be achieved and will help determine whether the cost of
achieving those values is warranted. 208
203. The food stamp program is another example of this kind of assistance. It may
also explain the category of vulnerable groups whom the Commission has desired to
protect. In each individual transaction the "vulnerable" person is probably not the
cheapest cost avoider but the economic costs of the regulation may be greater than the
economic benefits. Nevertheless the "vulnerable" status may be an indication that this
is a group that society wishes to protect at some cost.
204. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
205. Economic analysis in this context refers to the empirical science that predicts the
likely outcome of particular legal rules. BURROWS, supra note 196, at 6. Economic
analysis can be used to predict the costs and benefits of assigning the risk of buyer'S
misapprehensions. See, e.g., id. at 7. It is a legal impact study "which attempts to identify
and quantify the effects of law on measurable variables."
206. See, e.g., id. at 11. (normative allocation efficiency approach to law usually
proceeds by stating objective of law as minimization of social cost of an activity by
providing incentives that deter uneconomical losses).
207. See, e.g., id. at 15 ("The economic approach places at the forefront of discussion
the need to choose and costs and benefits of alternative choices which must always be a
relevant consideration where resources are limited.").
208. [d. at l6-17. ("If there is a conflict between efficiency and justice the nature of
the trade-offs can be illuminated by economic analysis; and since the attainment of
justice usually involves the use of resources the economic approach can contribute to
normative discussions by providing information on the cost ofjustice.").
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Deception then should be defined as those statements for which
the cost of prevention would be warranted by the benefits in terms
of reduced consumer misapprehension of such prevention. Such a
policy would require the Commission to estimate the costs of
preventing advertisers from making certain claims and the benefits
of protecting particular consumers.
One advantage of the policy endorsed here is that it requires the
Commission to clearly articulate the social policies and values that
are being employed. As indicated a pure cost benefit analysis is not
appropriate. 209 But it is better to clearly state that a particular cost
or benefit is being given greater weight (e.g., protection of a particu
lar group is or is not worth the cost) than to hide behind vague
terms like "reasonable."210 Another advantage is that the Commis
sion would be forced to clearly articulate the way it is using social
science rather than just to present a lot of numbers and to announce
the result. 211 The Commission should reveal the conclusions it is
drawing from the available information. Therefore, even though
the Commission would not have "perfect" information it would
have to be rational in its extrapolati~n from what it has. 212 That
reasoning would then be available for public scrutiny. This would
allow more intelligent analysis and criticism of Commission actions.
Finally the Commission would be able to use empirical research de
veloped in one context for decision in another.
b.

Applying the Definition

In the advertising substantiation program, the potentially decep
tive statement is the implied statement regarding the likelihood that
the product will conform to the advertised claim. 213 The definition
of deception used in this article concerns those situations where the
benefits of clearing up misconceptions regarding the likelihood that
209. In fact Professor Markovitz points out that a cost benefit analysis in some
situations would give the ambiguous result that both rejection and adoption of the
policy are cost benefit justified. See Markovitz. supra note 185.
210. Governmental instutitions should reveal the "real" reasons for decisions rather
than hide behind the excuse that the "law" requires the decision. The policy advocated
in this article would require the Commission to acknowledge its value choices rather
than hide behind words such as "reasonable" or "deceptive." See Singer supra note 180
at 51-54.
211. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
212. Neither the Commission. advertisers nor academia can yet determine with
precision the degree to which consumer purchase decisions are effected by particular
advertising messages.
213. This should be distinguished from the level of substantiation claimed. which is
the reference point under current Commission policy. See SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT,
supra note 19.
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a product conforms to a claim are warranted by the costs of prevent
ing that misconception. The benefits of preventing such statements
will be based on the money that would be spent on a product under
such a misapprehension that would not be spent if consumers cor
rectly understood the likelihood that the product met a specified
standard.
The benefit analysis should be based on genuine research into
consumer expectations and not on a vague assertion that consumers
expect all claims to be substantiated. 214 Studies of the effects ofvar
ious kinds of messages can be used for application in particular
cases. Many commentators would agree with many of the "indicia"
of substantiation that the Commission has found in prior cases. 215
For example one writer has shown that the effect of substantiating
material such as "tests show" or "laboratory tests show" is clear:
"[I]n most cases [consumers] perceive substantiated claims as more
reliable and helpful than unsubstantiated claims." Comparison ad
vertisements may imply "factual information, often in the form of
scientific tests or independent research has been gathered" as a ba
sis for the comparison claim. 216 A Commission staff report stated
214. The Commission argues that all claims carry with them the implied claim of
substantiation. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 59 (1972); Reports, supra note 20;
Miller, supra note 55, and is often uncontested by advertisers themselves. See, e.g.,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 444 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973). This article rejects the Commission's argument. The
problem with the Commission's argument and all who make it is that all of those who
make it find it necessary to qualify the need for substantiation for all claims in ways that
detract from a coherent analysis. For example, the Consumer Protection Division
advocated distinguishing between subjective and objective claims. See MEMORANDUM,
supra note 61, at 67. But then a determination must be made whether claims were
objective or subjective. It is easier to simply ask whether consumers interpret the ad as
representing a claim of substantiation without also drawing the objective, subjective
distinction. Corporations responding to the Commission request for Comments also
indicated that there was no research indicating that consumers expected scientific
evidence, laboratory tests, prior written certification, or other specific forms of
documentation. See, e.g., Sears, supra note 106 at 25-26.
215. Leigh & Martin, Comparative Advertising: The Effiet of Claim Type and Brand Loyalty,
in CURRENT ISSUES AND RESEARCH IN ADVERTlSlNG 197840, 50 U. Leigh & R. Martin eds.
1978). Words like "medically proven" in one part of an advertisement are construed as
applying to the main part of the advertisement. American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC,
695 F.2d 681, 690 (3d Cir. 1983). "Recently laboratory science has perfected" a
product or the product is "proven and sound" represent that the seller has scientific
evidence to prove that substantially all users would benefit from the product as
advertised. Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 302 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 950 (1980). See also Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21,322 (1983), aff'd, 738 F2d
554 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Scientific tests show," tests show," laboratory tests show," a picture
of a computer typewriter printing out numbers while announcer speaks about scientific
tests only enhances an impression of establishement but does not create it); Standard
Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1472 (1974), modified, 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978).
216. Leigh & Martin, supra note 215, at 40.
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that, "consumers probably infer that ads stating figures to two or
three decimal points implicitly claim that substantial evidence sup
ports those figures," and that, "novel claims concerning the techni
cal properties of a product are likely to imply scientific testing or
endorsement by a qualified expert rather than consumer
surveys."217 The Commission's concept of "establishment claims"
is an effort to attach deceptive' conduct to situations where con
sumer confidence in advertising claims is increased by scientific ap
pearance and where the truth of the claim may be difficult for the
Commission to determine. 218 The Commission should identify
those qualities of products which are "credence" qualities. 219 As re
searchers have demonstrated, credence qualities are the qualities for
which consumers cannot determine the truthfulness of claims.
Therefore, consumers are more likely to depend on substantiation
developed by others-including the advertiser-in determining the
likelihood that the claim is true.
Although the Commission has begun to do some empirical re
search, the Commission appears to be headed in the wrong direc
tion based on the purposes of the program outlined in this article.
The Commission is apparently attempting to determine merely the
level of testing consumers expect advertised products to have. 22o As
indicated above the Commission should be exploring the consumer
expectations regarding the likelihood that claims are true. Never
theless empirical research would be a valuable first step for the
Commission, if the Commission uses the research in the context of
an empirical standard such as the one advocated in this article.
Moreover, the Commission must engage in research to determine
the socio-economic characteristics of those who are deceived by
false advertising claims.
Analysis of the benefit factors has focused on those factors that
increase the number of consumers who believe a particular claim.
The harm suffered by those who purchase a product under a misap
prehension must also be determined. Because the analysis will be
similar to that used for the deceptiveP basis of advertising substanti
ation, it would be better to postpone consideration of those factors.
Similarly it will promote clarity to discuss the factors to consider in
217. MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 13.
218. See text accompanying notes 117-18, for an explanation of the standard applied
in establishment claims.
219. See supra note 61.
220. The Commission has announced its intention to conduct empirical research
regarding substantiation but has yet not actually conducted such tests. See infra note
246.
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determining the costs of regulation at the same time as this article
discusses the costs of regulation based on deceptiveP behavior.
2.

DeceptiveP Behavior

The Commission should require some level of substantiation for
all claims as a legitimate vehicle for preventing advertisers from en
gaging in a practice that makes the existence of deceptive claims
more likely (deceptiveP conduct). If one engages in the practice of
making claims without knowledge of whether they are true or false,
claims more likely will be false than if one only makes claims on the
basis of relevant information regarding the product. The truth or
falsity of a particular claim is not relevant. Even if the claim is true,
the advertiser has engaged in a deceptive practice, if the advertiser
has failed to test the claim before disseminating it. The purpose of
the substantiation program is to achieve a higher level of accuracy in
all advertisements by compelling sellers to conduct better testing of
potential claims. 221 The program has been successful in this regard.
One internal Commission memorandum cited several reports that
concluded that. the advertising substantiation program had moti
vated a substantial portion of the advertising industry to develop
substantiation before disseminating claims. The program had
served to deter untruthful claims. 222
Consumer expectations are not relevant in determining the
amount of substantiation required. Regardless of the amount of
substantiation consumers expect advertisers to have, the Commis
sion is making an independent judgment of the amount of substanti
ation it is reasonable to expect of sellers making particular kinds of
claims. 223
221. For Robert Pitofsky's statement regarding accuracy in advertising see Pitofsky,
supra note 69, at 36.
222. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 12, 23-24.
Some responses to the Commission's request for comments on the program have also
indicated that this might be the case. In responding to the request for comments the
Consumers Union stated that the program had reduced the number of claims for which
there is no basis and has improved the quality of product performance claims.
Consumers Union, Remarks in Response for Comments About the Advertising
Substantiation Program 2 (July 13, 1983) (FTC's request available in 48 Fed. Reg.
10471) [hereinafter cited as Consumers Union]; NBC, supra note 50, at 4 (substantiation
received for advertisements improved though they cannot determine cause).
223. This departure from a consideration of consumer expectations demonstrates a
difference from the proposed standards considered by the Commission. The
Commission's policy is grounded solely in considerations of consumer expectations.
See, Miller, supra note 55, at 2. The approach proposed here resembles in some respects
the substantiation policy outlined by NBC. NBC has established standards for the type
of support that is appropriate depending upon the type of claim that is being made, e.g.,
performance claims, ingredient claims, sales and price claims. The susceptibility of the
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Although a cost benefit type of analysis would also be appropriate
for determining the types of substantiation to require, the factors to
be weighed are slightly different. The substantiation rule requires
sellers to expend resources on additional levels of testing; the cost is
the cost of the testing. But where the cost of testing exceeds the
value of the claim to the advertiser, the advertiser will not make that
claim. Therefore, one potential cost of the program is that consum
ers will not be aware that products meet particular needs. The ben
efits are determined by the value of generating the information to
consumers.224
The benefit of requiring additional testing is a function of the
harm to be avoided and the likelihood that a claim may be false.
The harm that is to be avoided is that consumers might purchase a
product under a misapprehension regarding that product. The
measure of the harm may be no more than the difference in value
between what the consumer thinks he is getting and what he gets
along with some incidental expenses III aggravation and
repurchasing.
There are additional factors that increase the scope of the harm to
be avoided. Where the failure of a product to conform to consum
ers' expectations causes property damage or bodily injury, the harm
is greater than the price of the product. Products, which may cause
greater harm, are likely to be products where a greater level of sub
stantiation is in order. A general rule that health and safety claims
deserve a higher level of substantiation. 225 The only reason for cre
ating health and safety claims as a special category is the potential
for harm if the claim is not true. Where, however, even if the claim
is not true there would be no significant health costs, those products
or claims should be evaluated as more mundane products or claims
product to the type of testing also is considered. For example, for performance claims,
although testing in normal use is preferred, large items such as washing machines can be
lab tested. NBC, supra note 50, at 8-12. NBC claims it requires advertising claims for
over the counter drugs and health related products to be supported by well-controlled
clinical studies. In the case of non-comparative claims the network relies on the FDA
OTC panel monogram studies. Id. at 11-12.
224. Note that this statement in text differs from stating that the costs must be less
than the benefits. For a discussion of the proper application of a cost benefit analysis,
see supra notes 181-235 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 697 (3d Cir. 1983)
(controlled clinical tests required for nonprescription analgesic); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398,456 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 414
U.S. 1112 (1973); Stihl, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 840,851 (1983) (one controlled test required
for chain saw claims based on safety considerations). In terms of consumer
expectations, the Consumers Union suggested higher standards for health and safety
claims as well as "large ticket items." Consumers Union, supra note 222, at 11-12.
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are evaluated. 226 In Bristol-Myers Co. the harm of headache remedies
not conforming to the claim was in reality more limited. There were
no allegations that the pills would be worse than aspirin or that they
would cause harm of which consumers may not be aware. But the
Commission's substantiation requirements were exacting, even
though the Commission did not base its rather strict substantiation
requirements on more than generalized concerns regarding health
and safety claims. 227
The size of the manufacturer or the size of the advertising cam
paign in question is another factor in measuring the scope of the
harm. 228 Where a small manufacturer or a limited ad campaign in
226. Another reason for requiring a higher standard for health claims is that,
"Pervasive government regulation of drugs and consumer expectations about such
regulation create a climate in which questionable claims about drugs have all the more
power to mislead." American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 697 (3d Cir.
1983).
227. But see American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 698 (3d Cir. 1983)
(health risks may be significant because "[t]he larger dosages of aspirin which AHP
exhorts consumers to ingest increase the dangers of adverse side effects, with little
evidence that there' exist any countervailing benefits"). However, here the Commission
is probably proceeding under deceptive' since many indicia of claims of testing are
present in the case. Otherwise, the standard of two clinical tests may have been too
harsh. Clinical tests are required of all drugs by the FDA to be sure the product is both
safe and effective. For that reason, it may be sufficient to require only one clinical test if
there is no concern of significant health risks. See Comment, supra note 113, at 469.
Therefore, the citing of all of the potential health risks in taking aspirin in American Home
Products may not have been appropriate.
Bristol-Myers raised a more troubling issue for advertising substantiation. The
manufacturer suggested that it would have been appropriate for participants in studies
to know the product they were using since the expectations created by the advertising
may actually cause a reduction in pain. Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 335-36 (1983)
aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984). The manufacturer argued that the placebo effect
must be taken into account for medicines directed at pain. The Commission dismissed
this argument summarily. !d. Bristol-Myers suggested, however, that the advertising
itself is part of the product. If consumers are willing to pay an additional amount for a
product that kills pain faster, does it matter that part of the effectiveness of the product
is the consumers' predisposition that it will be effective? It may be that where a
manufacturer makes this type of claim it should be allowed to use evidence from studies
where the administrators of the test do not know the product the subject was using but
the subjects do. However, the other products possibly should be accompanied with
some assurances of their quality. It might also be true that if no products were allowed
to advertise that their ingredients are better than aspirin, the placebo effect currently
enjoyed by well marketed brands would then be enjoyed by what consumers now see to
be "just plain old aspirin."
A better basis for the standards applied in the drug cases is the fact that the claims
involved are easily susceptible to the type of controlled studies that the Commission
required and that a "testing industry" for these products is already in place. These
factors are "cost" factors; they suggest that stricter standards are appropriate for drug
products because rigorous testing standards would not be prohibitively expensive).
228. One writer suggests that small manufacturers should be allowed to rely on the
general state of medical knowledge or the tests of larger manufacturers. See Comment,
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dicates that the advertising will not cause a significant amount of
harm the government's regulation may not be warranted.
The likelihood that a claim is false must also be evaluated in de~
termining the benefits of a proposed substantiation standard. Fur~
ther study is likely to be cost effective to the extent that it is highly
likely that it produces new information regarding the efficacy of a
product. For each product it is important to determine the likeli
hood that further testing would reduce the harm that the product
will not perform as claimed.
The actual cost of conducting tests is easily determined. The
Commission, however, has not paid attention to the actual cost of
testing they have required. 229 Advertisers in submitting comments
to the Commission provided no information on the costs of tests. 230
But the cost most often referred to by the program's critics is the
inhibition of the dissemination of useful information to consumers.

supra note 113, at 448. But see Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 68 (1972) (cannot rely on claims
of competitors but might be able to rely on competitors study). See Cacioppo & Petty,
Persuasiveness of Communications Is Affected by Exposure, Frequency and Message Q;t<1lity: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Persisting Attitude Change, in CURRENT ISSUES AND
RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING 197897, 114 (1. Leigh & R. Martin eds. 1978) (repetition of
strong arguments increases persuasive effect).
229. In Thompson Medical Co., it was found that clinical tests would cost $30,000.
The Commission contrasted this cost to Thompson's six million dollars in sales. 104
F.T.C. 648, 823-24 (1984).
Because advertising substantiation will impact advertising, a more appropriate
comparison might be with a company's advertising budget. For example, Thompson
Medical Co. spent 39 million dollars on advertising in 1984. Comparable figures for
other advertisers discussed in this article are: Kellogg Co., $208,000,000; Bristol-Myers,
$258,000,000; Sterling Drug, $166,000,000; Fort $559,000,000. See ADVERTISING AGE
September 26, 1985, 1l and ADVERTISING AGE June 13, 1985, 11 for tables listing
corporate advertising costs.
230. This statement is based on the author's examination of comments submitted to
the Commission. Chairman Miller acknowledged that little information was supplied.
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This criticism has been raised by the Commission,231 advertisers,232
and independent observers of the program. 233
There are, however, a variety of factors that could limit the
amount of damage that the program would cause in inhibiting the
dissemination of useful information to consumers. Advertisers may
obtain advisory opinions from the Commission to determine
whether the advertiser has sufficient substantiation for a claim. 234
Advertisers may also place disclaimers on their advertisements limit
ing the impact of their messages. 235 However, when using disclaim
ers deceptive' and deceptive P claims would be handled differently.
Where the commission is concerned that the claim of substantiation
increases the impact of the advertisement, which is true in the
deceptive' situation, a disclaimer would be effective to limit that im
pact. However, where the Commission is concerned with the
amount of substantiation necessary to support a claim-a deceptiveP
consideration-a statement indicating the amount of substantiation
that the advertiser actually has to support the claim may not be suffi

231. "[O]verly burdensome substantiation requirements prevent consumers from
receiving useful information." MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 28; FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, CONSUMER INFORMATION REMEDIES 259-60 (1979) (focus on objective
claims may have led advertisers to use more subjective claims). Chairman Miller has
placed special emphasis on the risks of suppressing truthful claims. See Miller, supra note
136, at 1.
232. Several advertisers who responded to the Commission's request for comments
devoted a considerable amount of time to the problem of getting information to
consumers. See, e.g., Sears, supra note 106, at 27 (claiming even though substantial costs
may have been incurred in developing performance information for product, ultimate ad
copy may be significantly "watered down" or some claims even deleted if serious
concern arises over what subsequent Commission interpretation might be). Although
claiming that potentially valuable information that would help reasonable consumers
make an informed decision is not communicated, Sears and other industry respondents
give no examples. Sears does say that a review of Sears advertising since 1971 shows
that it has become generally less informative about product features and benefits, but
acknowledges that this is due as much to rising advertising costs as to the Commission
Ad Substantiation Program. /d. at 34-35.
233. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 106, at 437. A typical comment was the following:
"Lots of the effects of the program are to drive advertising from some sort of factual
claim which mayor may not be verified at the time it's made (it may not be capable of
being completely verified), into puffery." Tollison, "Efficiency," "Cost Benefit" and Other
Key Words-The Practical uses of Economics at the FTC, 51 ANTITRUST LJ. 581, 584
[hereinafter cited as Tollison].
234. The Commission Rules of practice so provide. 16 C.F.R. § 53.16(d) (1984). See,
e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, (1965); Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C.
21 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984).
235. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.
1984) (advertiser can carefully qualify claim "so that it discloses the level of support
actually possessed").
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dent. The advertiser would have to modify the claim itself. 236 The
problem of disclaiming in deceptiveP situations is highlighted in the
"substantial question" theory adopted by the Commission in the
American Home Products Corp. v. FTC case. 237 The theory, which was
only one basis ofliability, provided that when the seller made claims
about the superiority of Anacin and Arthritis Pain Formula in the
absence of two well controlled clinical studies it was deceptive to fail
to state that there was a substantial question regarding the truth of
the claim. The theory was presented in a confusing manner, partly
because the court appeared to be papering over Commission vacilla
tion regarding whether the theory of the case was "reasonable ba
sis" or "substantial question."238 But the Commission's policy can
be easily understood as follows: it is deceptive for the advertiser to
make claims regarding the effectiveness of a drug without the appro
priate amount of testing. To say merely that "we base this claim on
our president'S use of the product" would not be a sufficient dis
claimer. But to say "there is a substantial question in the scientific
community regarding this claim" would have the effect of changing
the nature of the claim itself; it would minimize the scope of the
claim.
.
Manufacturers have complained that the Commission does not al
low sellers to quality claims. 239 In some instances the Commission
has rejected qualifications that were contained in advertisements as
ineffective. For example, when Ford Motor Company placed adver
tisements stating that "all 5 Ford Motor Co. small cars get over 25
mpg," the Commission required substantiation that the gasoline
consumption rates were acquired through the performance an ordi
236. A similar policy is evident in the severe limitations imposed on sellers restricting
the effectiveness of express warranties. See, e.g., UCC § 2-316 (1978):
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but . . .
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction
is unreasonable.
Similarly some state statutes restrict sellers' ability to limit remedies for express warran
ties. Md. Commercial Law § 2-316.1(3) (1983)(severely restricts modifications or limita
tions on remedies pertaining to express warranties).
237. American Home Prod. Corp. v. ITC, 695 F.2d 681, 694 (3d Cir. 1983). The
"substantial question doctrine" was abandoned by the Commission. See Bristol-Myers
Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aJl'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984). As demonstrated in the
text the theory was a valid complement to other aspects of the advertising substantiation
doctrine and not duplicative as indicated by the Commission. The theory is an
expression of the advertising substantiation doctrine directed at deceptive" claims.
238. See American Home Prod. Corp. v. ITC, 695 F.2d 681, 694 (3d Cir. 1983).
239. See, e.g., The Kellogg Company, Remarks in Response to Request for Comments
on the Advertising Substantiation Program 3 (July 14, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Kellogg].
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nary driver typically would obtain from standard models. 240 The
Commission took this action despite the fact that the ad contained
the following statement:
[T]he mileage you get depends on many factors: equipment,
engine displacement, vehicle weight, local road conditions,
and your personal driving style. So the mileage you get may
be less or even more than the figures quoted here. 241
But this case can be explained by the sharp difference between the
bold headline and the small print retraction. 242 The Commission,
therefore, judged the likelihood that consumers would understand
the significance of the disclaimer. It is doubtful that the Commis
sion was preventing consumers from benefitting from valuable in
formation where the advertisement actually conveyed untrue-or at
least unsubstantiated-information. Moreover, to evaluate the
Commission's action in terms of cost it is necessary to determine the
value of the information being restricted. If the information,
though true, is not really significant to the purchase decision, noth
ing of value is being lost. In Ford Motor Co., consumers were not
given informat~on regarding expected fuel consumption costs or the
relative fuel consumption costs of several cars under typical condi
tions. Treatment of disclaimers would be different in deceptive' and
deceptiveP cases. To the extent that the disclaimer modifies the
claim, it mitigates a finding of deception in deceptiveP cases. To the
extent that it modifies the assertion regarding the likelihood the
claim is true, it mitigates against a finding of deceptive conduct.
In some cases, the Commission may have required substantiation
requirements that deny consumers information they might like to
have and, at the same time, may have done so in a way that pre
vented sellers from making a legitimate disclaimer. For example,
the Commission required scientific tests as opposed to the opinion
of Road & Track magazine that the Vega was "the best handling car."
If handling is strictly a matter of opinion and if consumers are inter
S

240. Ford Motor Co., 87 F.T.C. 756 (remand order), reh g denied, 88 F.T.C. 53 (1976),
93 F.T.C. 873 (1979).
241. Id. at 759. Another case that illustrates this point is Camp Chevrolet, 84 f'.T.C.
648, 650 (1974) (respondent's advertisement was reprint of newspaper story describing
mileage test and contained similar disclaimer).
242. Ford, supra note 240, at 764. The ten words in the claim (HAll Ford Motor
Company Small Cars Got Over 26 MPG") occupy twelve times as much space as the 37
words in the disclaimer. For the wording of the disclaimer, see supra text accompanying
note 241 and see Uf. at Exhibit A, 759.
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ested in the opinion of Road & Track, there is no way to convey that
·information to consumers. 243
Close analysis reveals that prior Commission decisions have not
actually prevented consumers from obtaining needed information.
The Kroger Co. case is an example of a Commission decision that
prevented an advertiser from distributing what appears to be useful
information. This is a favorite example frequently used by Timothy
Muris, former director of the Consumer Protection Division. 244
Kroger, a large supermarket chain, created a "Price Patrol" in which
homemakers surveyed prices of 100 to 150 items in local supermar
kets. The most significant aspect of the practice that concerned the
Commission was that the same Kroger official who selected the 600
products to be part of the sample also set the prices for Kroger.
The Commission found that the advertisements implicitly repre
sented that the surveys were "methodologically sound" and that the
surveys were not methodologically sound. 245 Since other surveys
indicated that Kroger's prices were frequently below or equal to its
competitors in many product lines, Mr. Muris cites this as an exam
ple of Commission action which deni.es consumers valuable infor
mation. Although the Commission has never before required
studies that conform to the high standards of reliability as it has
done in Kroger, Kroger's advertising was deceptive' because it
claimed that its price comparison information was backed up by a
rigorous survey.246 Therefore, the Commission properly held Kro
ger to a higher standard of proof regarding its price comparison
243. Of course, it is a matter of empirical research whether claims of smooth
"handling" effect consumers' expectation of the likelihood that the car will be easier for
them to drive and whether the car comports with that expectation. However, for
purposes of the "burden shifting" effect of the substantiation doctrine the advertiser
does have some substantiation for the claim. But for the purpose of the deceptive
practices aspect of the advertising substantiation program it may be that more expensive
scientific tests are not worth the value of the information.
244. 98 F.T.C. 639 (1981), modijied, 100 F.T.C. 573 (1982). A criticism of the case is in
MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 27.
245. !d. at 743. However, Kroger claimed it minimized the problem somewhat by
having some other person select the 100-150 product sample from the 600 product
selection. MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 27.
246. See, e.g., Tashofv. FTC, 437 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Guides Against Deceptive
Pricing, 16 C.F.R. pt. 233 (1986). Kroger claimed that it made it clear that this survey
was just being conducted by housewives. Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C. 639, 770 (1981),
modified, 100 F.T.C. 573 (1982) (Commissioner Bailey dissenting). However, it is quite
likely that to the consumer the statement that the study was conducted by housewives
increased the perceived validity of the study. This statement gave the impression of a
high degree of disinterestedness of those conducting the study. To the consumer this
may appear to be similar to the randomness required in empirical research. This
illustrates the distinction made in this article between basing substantiation
requirements on the type of substantiation consumers expect (the Commission

1986]

ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION

59

with other stores. The argument that the Commission is denying
consumers useful information must be questioned. The informa
tion is not useful if it is not true. Moreover, the critics of the opin
ion never consider the cost to Kroger of conducting studies that
comply with the Commission's standards. Only if the cost of such
studies is prohibitively high could it be argued that information is
denied as a result of the Commission's rule.
The one example of an advertising substantiation program deny
ing consumers access to valuable information is the claim by The
Kellogg Company that "the public was denied information on food,
health and nutrition because the Commission will not accept as ade
quate substantiation the type of epidemiological evidence and opin
ions of medical authorities that exists to support certain claims in
this area." Kellogg stated that even though epidemiological studies
show that populations consuming high fiber diet have a decreased
incidence of certain diseases of the colon, such as diverticulosis, the
Commission probably would not allow the following statement:
current scientific data tends to support the fact, if you eat a
higher fiber diet, you will be less vulnerable to certain
diseases. 247 .
But Kellogg never requested permission to run such an advertise
ment and could point to no Commission decision where such a cau
tious, qualified statement has been prevented or where such
evidence would not be permitted for such a claim. 248 Moreover, fol
lowing its assertion that the substantiation policy prevented such ad
vertisements, Kellogg actually did run advertisements making health
claims. 249 Therefore, despite the many claims that the advertising
substantiation program limits consumers access to valuable infor

approach) and consumers expectation regarding the likelihood that the claim is true (the
approach proposed in this article).
247. The Kellogg Company, Remarks in Response to Request for Comments on the
Advertising Substantiation Program 3 (July 14, 1983). For a discussion of Chairman
Miller's response to the Kellogg submission, see Miller, supra note 136, at 5.
248. In the case cited by Kellogg, J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir.
1967), the commercials portrayed Geritol as suitable for most instances of "tiredness."
The relative communicative strength given to various aspects of the advertising message
were considered in determining the nature of the claims actually made. 'Finally, Kellogg
points out that the Food and Drug Administration, not the Commission, is a more likely
opponent of the hypothetical claim. See Kellogg, supra note 239, at 3. Of course,
criticism of the FDA is not criticism of the Commission.
249. Interestingly enough the advertisement appears to exaggerate the product's
value in preventing cancer and glosses over other potential health problems related to
the product, such as the product's high sodium content.
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mation, few, if any, examples have been produced which actually
prove that point.250
One study that tests the hypothesis that advertising regulation
reduces the amount of useful information available to consumers.
The study was conducted with reference to the advertising substan
tiation program. 251 It has been cited for the proposition that the
advertising substantiation program has in fact caused advertisers to
reduce the amount of factual information placed in advertisements
and replaced that information with "puffery" oflittle use to consum
ers.252 The study compared the advertising for two types of prod
ucts that had been subject to advertising substantiation rounds
(anti-perspirants and pet foods) with two types of products that had
not been subjected to advertising substantiation rounds (skin lo
tions and prepared foods). For each product the advertising before
and after the advertising substantiation round were compared. The
latter group was treated as the control group to determine the effect
of the Commission action on advertising. 253 The study investigated
a number of hypotheses that would be true if the substantiation pro
gram did reduce the amount of valuable information in advertis
ing. 254 The study concluded that:
250. Chairman Miller pointed out that none of the responses to a recent request for
information contained any empirical evidence of the effect of the program on
advertising. See Remarks ofJames C. Miller III, Chairman Federal Trade Commission
Before the San Francisco Advertising Club 6 (September 30, 1983). See also, Tollison,
supra note 233, at 585 ("But the most remarkable feature about the Ad Substantiation
program is that nobody knows what it is doing. There never has been a careful
theoretical or empirical analysis of the impact of the program. ").
251. J. HEALEY, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION
PROGRAM AND CHANGES IN THE CONTENT OF ADVERTISING IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES (1978)
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Marketing, Univ. of California, Los Angeles) [hereinafter cited as
HEALEY].
252. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 106, at 457.
253. HEALEY, supra note 251, at 128.
254. Compared with the advertisements in the control group, the non-control group
advertisements would undergo the following changes:
1. There would be a decrease in the number of product attributes. Id.
at 29.
2. There would be greater emphasis given to inherently verifiable
attributes. Id. at 29.
3. More claims would either be verifiable on face value or be clearly
non-verifiable. Id. at 31-32.
4. There would be more claims of product comparisons rather than
general product class comparisons. Id. at 33.
5. The "mood" of advertising would be less authoritative and more
cautious. Id. at 34.
6. Advertisements would be either more informative or more non
informative. [d. at 37.
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The major finding of this study was the changes in the way
claims were verified in advertisements after the FTC advertis
ing substantiation program. Specifically, in 1976 advertise
ments, either claims were verified within the advertisement or
they were stated in an ambiguous, non verifiable manner; both
occurred with higher frequency that the previously used im
proper way of handling claims, having them just sound verifia
ble. This confirmed the predictions made in 1972 by industry
leaders that the advertisers would seek to avoid confronting
the FTC by making claims which were either "pure pap" or
very factual in nature . . .
It appears that perhaps the FTC advertising substantiation pro
gram might have served the function of making companies more
conscientious about the claims made in their advertisements. 256
On the other hand, there was some indication that the FTC adver
tising substantiation program may have, by default, sanctioned a
rise in the use of puffery, i.e., vague and exaggerative advertising
statements which cite no specific facts. 257
There are a number of problems with this study. The study did
not really involve randomly selected products or advertisements.
Only print advertising was investigated; there was no consideration
of broadcast advertising. A number of hypotheses were not proven
and in a couple cases evidence supported the opposite conclu
sion. 258 Even to the extent that the study detected changes after the
institution of the program, the study did not attempt to determine
whether there was a cause and effect relationship.259 More signifi
cantly, even if the advertising contained less factual information af
ter the institution of the program, the study did not consider
whether the information no longer available to consumer was accu
rate. Perhaps by compelling advertisers to resort to "puffery" the
Commission is compelling them to abandon the distribution of un
true information. The study itself quoted one commentator's state
255. !d. at 125.
256. !d. at 127.
257. [d. at 128.
258. The hypothesis regarding the presence of claims in the advertising was only
partially confirmed. /d. at 120, 126. The hypothesis regarding the types of attributes
that were advertised was only partially confirmed. ld. at 121. The hypothesis regarding
the presence of verification in the advertising itself was confirmed. /d. at 119. The
hypothesis regarding product comparisons "did not prove to be true." !d. at 122. The
hypothesis regarding the "mood" of the advertising was only partially confirmed. !d. at
121. The hypothesis regarding the informative quaiity of the advertising was not
confirmed. [d. In fact it was the control group advertising that became less informative.
/d. at 126.
259. [d. at 128.
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ment that puffery is "the ever-diminishing comer into which sellers
and advertisers have been painted by consumerism."26o Moreover,
a demonstration that advertising has become less authoritative may
also be a sign of the program's accomplishments. Advertisers may
be less likely to couch unsubstantiated claims in misleadingly scien
tific language. This is a demonstration of the positive effect of the
program in limiting deceptive S conduct.
There are a few "cost" factors in utilizing the problem which have
been suggested but which are not proper considerations. The Com
mission apparently believes that a proper factor to consider as a cost
of substantiation requirements is the "benefit to consumers if the
claim turns out to be true."261 For example, in Sperry Corp. the man
ufacturer claimed that the razor would solve the problems of razor
bumps for black men. 262 The Bureau of Consumer Protection has
argued that in demanding claim substantiation the Commission
should consider the potential benefits of the claim being true. 263
Another example is apparent in the advertising claim that products
low in cholesterol help reduce the incidence of heart disease. 264
The Bureau of Consumer Protection argued that if the claim is false
consumers lose a few cents but if it is true consumers will have less
risk of heart attack. In Sterling Drug, Inc., the Commission modified
an order that had originally prevented the manufacturer of Lysol
from claiming that use of Lysol on environmental surfaces would
reduce the risk of illness. 265 The Commission relied upon recent
evidence that some illnesses could be transmitted by contact with
environmental surfaces. 266 Chairman Miller argued that if the claim
was true consumers would be healthier but if it was not true, "con
sumers are injured only to the extent of the cost of their Lysol
purchase.' '267
Nevertheless in the context of allegations of deceptive' behavior
the concern should be with the likelihood that the claim is true. As
indicated in a separate statement by Commissioner Pertschuk in
Sterling Drug, the tests did not indicate a high degree of likelihood
260. !d. (quoting PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLOW Up 5 (1975».
261. Miller, supra note 55, at 3.
262. Sperry Corp., 98 F.T.C. 4 (1981).
263. MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 27.
264. !d. at 20.
265. 101 F.T.C. 375,379 (1983). The modified order allowed Sterling Drug to make
claims that environmental surfaces play role in transmission of viruses, if supported by
competent and reliable scientific evidence.
266. Id. at 337.
267. Id. at 382 (separate statement of Chairman James C. Miller III). In each of the
above cases, dramatic potential benefits are weighed against what appears to be minimal
cost.
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that the claim was true. 268 Therefore, the Commission should have
considered a way in which the claim could have been presented dif
ferently to consumers.269 In the context of allegations of deceptive P
behavior the calculation of the amount of substantiation must be
based on the cost of additional testing and the potential harm to be
prevented. To accept the advertiser's claimed benefit as a measure
of the potential benefit of the claim being true would be illogicaL
Otherwise there would be an incentive for advertisers to make wildly
optimistic claims. The true calculation is the probability that the
claim is true and whether the claim cannot be made without testing.
Moreover, in each case the harm caused by the claim may be under
stated. The few cents that are lost must be multiplied by the mil
lions of purchases involved. Consumers may forego better ways of
avoiding the problem for which the product is purchased. For ex
ample in the Lysol case, the advertising claims might have caused
consumers to become less vigilant about the proper procedures for
avoiding infection. Similarly in the "cholesterol" advertising cam
paign, consumers might not have taken other steps to reduce the
risk of heart attack.
One last factor in determining the appropriate level of substantia
tion is usual industry standards. 270 However, this is not relevant in
either deceptive' or deceptiveP actions. In deceptive' cases, con
sumer expectations control. In deceptiveP actions the Commission
should search for those industries where a significant amount of ad
vertising is presented without sufficient basis and make efforts to
upgrade industry standards rather than accept an industry norm of
inadequate substantiation. Thus, the level of substantiation cur
rently conducted in an industry is not an appropriate standard.
V.

BURDEN OF PROOF

The proposed application of an advertising substantiation policy
with regard to deceptiveS conduct upsets the traditional assignment
268. Id. at 383. Of course, Sterling Drug can prove it true to escape liability.
269. In fact, examination of the advertising that Lysol disseminated revealed an
attempt to exaggerate the likelihood that the product performed as claimed. The tag
line "Is it worth the cost?" implied that it was. For Lysol Advertising on file with
University of Cincinnati Law Review, see SSCB & Lintas Worldwide's Storyboard.
270. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., Remarks in Response the FTC's Request for
Comments About the Advertising Substantiation Program 22 (March 11, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Sears) (FTC's request available in 48 Fed. Reg. 10471). It is likely
that by saying the Commission would be guided by "the amount of substantiation
experts in the field believe is appropriate for the claim," Chairman Miller is implying
such a consideration. Otherwise, he would not need to establish it as a separate
consideration along with the costs and benefits. See Miller, supra note 55, at 3.
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of the burden of proof upon the Commission as the one attacking
the advertising. 271 The requirement for substantiation in all adver
tising claims violates the standard burden of proof presumption be
cause the seller is required to present proof that the product
conforms to certain claims and, failing to do so, is considered liable
for violating the FTCA.272 Since the Commission has abandoned
the program's purpose of serving as a source of information for con
sumers and competitors 273 requests for substantiation no longer
serve any purpose other than to compell advertisers to prove that
they are not violating the law. 274 However, none of the respondents
to the Commission's request for comments stated that they objected
to the demands for information because the demands raised burden
of proof problems. 275 All arguments that the program shifts the
burden of proof have been made in the context of litigating the
terms of cease and desist orders, not as objections to the advertising
substantiation program. 276 In one case the Commission ordered a
seller of eyeglasses to refrain from claiming to sell any articles of
merchandise at a "discount price". The Commission required that
the seller first take a statistically significant survey that showed
whether the prevailing price was indeed "substantially" higher than
the seller's price. 277 One member of the court felt that the require
ment improperly shifted to the seller the burden of "proving its
innocence."278
The law, however, does allow courts to recognize the presence of
presumptions with regard to a party's obligation to meet the burden
of presenting evidence. The advertising substantiation program in
the deceptive S context should be viewed not as shifting the ultimate
burden of proof but rather as shifting the production burden to the
27 L Commission rules provide that: "Counsel representing the Commission ... shall
have the burden of proof, but the proponent of any factual proposition shall be required
to sustain the burden of proof with respect thereto." 16 C.F.R. § 3.43 (1986).
272. See generally Gellhom, Rules of Evidence and Ojfo:ial Notice in Formal Administrative
Hearings, 1971 DUKE L J. 1,35-36 (1971).
273. See infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
274. In that situation the lack of substantiation would merely be discovered in the
course of preparing the information for the public. Now, however, the Commission
claims no other purpose for the substantiation demands than investigation of potential
sources oflitigation. It appears that the Commission initiates a deception case against a
seller by asking the seller to prove that the advertisement was not deceptive.
275. This statement is based on the author's examination of the documents.
276. See, e.g., Jay Norris v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979)(petitioner sought
review of Commission cease and desist order which prohibited mail order business from
advertising without prior written substantiation of representations).
277. Tashofv. FTC., 437 F.2d 707, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
278. /d. at 716 (Robb concurring in part' and dissenting in part).
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advertiser. It is not uncommon to place the production burden on
the party with access to the relevant information. 279
Secondly, the substantiation program creates a presumption that
unsubstantiated claims are not true. In the deceptive' context the
concern is with the likelihood that the claim is true. However, it may
be possible to establish that where an advertiser does not possess
the level of testing claimed it is likely that the claim is not true. The
Commission presumes that, absent additional evidence from the ad
vertiser, the claim is not true. 280
The Commission must still meet the ultimate burden of proof on
each issue. Once the advertiser has produced evidence of substanti
ation the Commission must demonstrate the degree to which con
sumers expect the claim to be true and demonstrate that the
substantiation does not support that expectation.
The Commission may be expected to independently establish the
level of substantiation needed for each claim in deceptiveP actions.
Advertisers should only be required to demonstrate the level of sup
port that they possess. The Commission still comports with the pol
icy of placing. the burden of proof on a moving party by
demonstrating that it has some rational basis for the selection of
advertisers from which the Commission requests information.
VI.

POST CLAIM SUBSTANTIATION

Another issue raised with regard to the advertisement substantia
tion program is whether advertisers should be allowed to introduce
post-claim evidence. 281 In situations where a claim was not substan
tiated at the time the advertisements were first disseminated, the
seller may be able to produce substantiation for the claim when re
quested by the Commission. The stated policy of the Commission is
that only substantiation deVeloped at the time the claim was first
disseminated is relevant. 282 Many advertisers complain that the
279. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 950 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
280. Courts have recognized similar presumptions. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF
TORTS § 209 (4th ed. 1971). For example, courts were willing to presume that a
statement is made with fradulent intent when the claim is made without a sufficient basis.
For references to deceit and misrepresentation cases and articles see supra note 135.
281. This issue is distinguished from the procedural issue involving the advertiser's
substantiation at the time the advertiser disseminated the claim but, for one reason or
another, did not submit it in a timely fashion to the Commission. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.4
(1984).
282. In Pfizer, Inc., the Commission made it clear that for purposes of the ad
substantiation requirement, it is essential that substantiation "be possessed [by the
seller] before the claim is made." 81 F.T.C. 23, 64 (1972) (emphasis in original). See
Reports, supra note 20 (Commission resolution requiring submission of substantiating
materials developed "as they had in their possession prior to the time claims,

66

CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Commission's rules are too rigid and that it does not make sense to
punish an advertiser who makes a true claim.
Advertisers have recommended three exceptions: implied claims,
a demonstration of good faith by an advertiser, and a demonstration
by the advertiser that the claim is true. The reason given for advo
cating consideration of post claim evidence when there are implied
claims is that the advertiser at least has a reasonable argument that
the claim was not actually made. In other words, at the time the
seller disseminated the advertisement, the seller did not realize that
a particular meaning was being inferred by the public and therefore
did not develop substantiation for that meaning. 283 Businesses have
argued that the advertiser's "good faith" should be taken into ac
count in determining whether post claim substantiation should be
admitted. The basic argument is that where the advertiser made the
claim in "good faith" nothing is to be gained by extracting a punish
ment if the advertiser can demonstrate a reasonable basis for the
claim. 284 When claims turn out to be true, it has been argued that it
is a waste of Commission resources to prosecute advertisers who are
not making deceptive statements. 285

•

statements, or representations [were] made . . . "). Notwithstanding this rule, the
Commission staff has considered this post claim evidence in deciding whether to
recommend further proceedings against the advertiser. MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at
29-30 n.57. One Administrative Law Judge has stated that post-complaint evidence
proving the claims would bear on the public interest in the proceeding. Litton Indus.,
97 F.T.C. 1,46 n.27 (1981). For reasons discussed in this section of this paper, that view
would be incorrect. In Porter 1& Dietsch, the seller of appetite suppressants for weight
control was denied the right to have an FDA report considered since it was prepared
after the advertising presentation had been made. Porter & Deitsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605
F.2d 294, 302 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980). Given the above
analysis, the court was in error where the focus of the action was the truth or falsity of
the advertising claims.
283. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 29; Sears, supra note 270, at 24 ( "The post
claim results corroborating the pre-claim results confirm the reasonableness of the
advertiser's reliance on the pre-claim results as well as confirm the truthfulness of the
claim."); Ass'n of National Advertisers, Inc., Remarks in Response to the FTC's Request
for Comments about the Advertising Substantiation Program 2 (June 22, 1983) (FTC's
request is available in 48 Fed. Reg. 10471) [hereinafter cited as ANA] (recommending
that where claim is not explicitly stated and is alleged by Commission to be implied
substantiation developed at any time should be admissible to support the truthfulness of
the claim).
284. See Sears, supra note 106, at 23-24; Consumers Union, supra note 222, at 10 ("a
flat no subsequent evidence rule where there was good faith could discourage [product
evaluation],,). Timothy Muris, former Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection,
has also suggested that the Commission should distinguish between evidence developed
before and evidence developed after a claim is challenged by the F.T.C. Because
substantiation developed before the Commission challenged the claim is credible and is
not developed to complicate Commission enforcement it should be considered.
MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 30.
285. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 30.
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Chairman Miller stated that there is "strong support for the idea
that substantiation should exist before the claims are made," and
the Commission has not adopted a special rule for implied claims
but has outlined situations where the Commission will consider post
claim substantiation. The four exceptions are when (1) evaluating
the truth of the claim; (2) deciding whether there is public interest;
(3) deciding the appropriate scope of the order; and (4) assessing
the reasonableness of the prior substantiation. 286
The issue of the acceptability of post claim substantiation should
be analyzed separately for each of the two purposes of the advertis
ing substantiation program identified in this article. For deceptive'
situations the purpose is penalizing advertisers who make untrue
statements regarding the product itself. Advertisers should be al
lowed to prove that the statement is actually true; that the claimed
likelihood that the product has particular benefits is true. However,
for deceptiveP practices, the truth or falsity of the claim is not rele
vant. It is the practice of making claims without sufficient basis that
is being punished. An advertiser who makes statements without
knowing whether they are true or false is likely to make some false
statements even if the particular statement for which he is being
prosecuted turns out to be true. Pursuing unsubstantiated but true
claims does not waste Commission resources because once the
Commission has identified an advertiser who engages in deceptiveP
conduct it is appropriate to proceed and capitalize on the invest
ment in the investigation that brought the advertiser to the Commis
sion's attention. Post claim substantiation should never be
admissible in such cases. 287 This is a more rational approach to the
question of post claim substantiation. The Commission's four ex
ceptions add nothing and may only serve to confuse matters.
Chairman Miller was correct in stating that it is analytically incon
sistent to apply a different standard where implied claims are in
volved. The intent of the advertiser is not at issue in Section Five
actions. The meaning of the claim is decided in the same way it
would be in any other Section Five case. The advertiser must take
the risk that an advertising claim will be interpreted in a variety of

286. DECEPTION STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 4-6.
287. The exceptions noted by the Commission are appropriate only as long as the
issue of whether the advertiser had a reasonable basis at the time it made the claim is not
forgotten. Interestingly enough, the one court which found making an unsubstantiated
claim was a violation of the Lanham Act emphasized that substantiation had to be in the
possession of the advertiser at the time the claim was made. See Johnson & Johnson v.
Quality Pure Mfg., Inc., 484 F. Supp. 975, 983 (D.N]. 1979).
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ways. The advertiser must have substantiation for all interpreta
tions a substantial number of people are likely to make. 288
VII.

RULE OR ADJUDICATION

The setting of substantiation requirements may be conducted
more appropriately by rulemaking as opposed to adjudication. 289
Presumably a rulemaking proceeding is more appropriate when the
Commission intends to require conduct that was not considered le
gally necessary until the enactment of the rule. An adjudicated order
is more appropriate where the legal standard has already been es
tablished. The Administrative Procedure Act defines a rule as "an
agency statement of general or partial applicability and future ef
fect"290 and should be adopted by agency rulemaking proce
dures. 291 The Supreme Court has held that a rule within the
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act was invalid when
promulgated within an adjudicatory context. 292 Yet the Court has
given agencies considerable discretion in determining whether to
proceed by rulemaking proceeding or by adjudication. 293
288. A substantial number is that amount that raised it the statement to deception
under § 5.
289. The original Federal Trade Commission Act did not expressly empower the
agency to engage in rulemaking. Nevertheless courts recognized the agency's power to
do so. See National Petroleum Ref. Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672,697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
em. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Congress explicitly granted the power in the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
93-637, § 202, 88 Stat. 2183 (1974), codified 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1982).
As indicated, some Commission rules already have substantiation components.
However these rules do not set forth specific substantiation requirements.
290. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 344 (1982).
291. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). For example, a dishonest
claim is dearly a violation of the proscription of deceptive practices and therefore
should be dealt with in an adjudicatory proceeding. But when the Commission wanted
to require advertisers to include energy consumption information in advertising for
certain electrical products, it was more appropriate to require those disclosures in a rule
making proceeding. Adjudication is more appropriate where only one company is being
pursued; rule making is more appropriate to change the conduct of an entire industry.
292. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). The Court upheld the
reasoning of the First Circuit in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir. 1968),
that a prior NLRB rule announced in an adjudicatory proceeding regarding the
furnishing of employee lists was invalid. The First Circuit reasoned that it was not
adopted by rulemaking proceedings, but because the NLRB had also ordered the
company to supply lists in an adjudicatory context, its order could be upheld. An order
to supply the lists was appropriate but a rule that lists should be furnished was not
allowed. 394 U.S. at 766. But see American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681,
695 n.22 (3d Cir. 1983) (court notes that party did not allege that Commission abused
its discretion by announcing substantial question test in an adjudicative rather than in
rulemaking proceeding),
293. The Commission has announced rules prospectively in adjudicatory
proceedings. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). The Commission announced the
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Rulemaking would not be as effective in the deceptive' context
because with deceptive" conduct the advertising substantiation doc
trine is only a vehicle for dealing with misleading statements regard
ing product claims. In the deceptiveP context rulemaking may be
more appropriate because the Commission is often developing in
dustry standards divorced from consideration of common industry
practice. In deceptiveP cases the Commission could develop more
coherent regulations for each industry by the use of a rulemaking
proceeding. The Commission has developed cease and desist or
ders for individual companies based on the particular deceptive
practice in which each company engaged. 294 This has led to some
confusion and inconsistency.295 Moreover, other products and
companies have not been involved. A better procedure may be a
rulemaking proceeding in which the true costs and benefits of par
ticular standards could be explored on an industry wide basis. The
Commission to a certain extent has attempted this cost benefit anal
ysis for some industries and particular types of claims. 296
Recently the Ninth Circuit reversed an Commission order on the
grounds that the rule applied was inappropriate for a cease and de
sist proceeding and should have been announced as a rule. 297 The
Commission had held in the context of a cease and desist proceed
ing that it was a deceptive trade practice for an automobile dealer to
fail to account to consumer debtors for surpluses generated from
the foreclosure of repossessed cars. There, however, the court was
dealing with conduct that was presumably generally accepted in the
reasonable basis standard, id. at 62, but did not find Pfizer liable. The Commission staff
had argued that, for a product like Un-burn, a reasonable basis could only be met by
controlled clinical tests. Id. at 73. The Commission refused to order a remand stating
that "the significance of this particular case lies, therefore, not so much in the entry of a
cease and desist order against this individual respondent, but in the resolution of the
general issue of whether the failure to possess a reasonable basis for affirmative product
claims constitutes an unfair practice...." /d. at 73-74.
294. Advertising standards are now developing for over-the-counter drugs. See, e.g.,
American Home Prod. Corp. v..FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d CiL 1983); Bristol-Myers Co.,
102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), alf'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984); Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C.
395 (1983), alf'd, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th CiL 1984), Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C.
648 (1984). Interestingly enough it was an over-the-counter drug, Un-Burn, which was
involved in the first advertising substantiation case. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
Surprisingly, in Sterling Drug, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 375 (1983), the Commission modified an
order dealing with claims of health benefits (the use ofLysol to prevent disease) without
considering the body of Commission law in the area.
295. See, e.g., the court's difficulty in dealing with the Commission's substantial
question doctrine discussed supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., Rules for Using Energy Costs and Consumption Information Used in
Labeling and Advertising for Consumer Appliances Under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, 16 C.F.R. § 305 (1986).
297. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th CiL 1982).
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business and which was arguably consistent with the governing stat
ute, the state's VCC.298 Even to the extent that the advertising sub
stantiation requirement is seen as prohibiting only deceptive P
behavior, it still involves the prevention of the likelihood that decep
tion occurs. It is unlikely that the business community would claim
that the practice had been common prior to the Commission's
decision. 299
Although it was appropriate for the Commission to announce the
new advertising substantiation doctrine in the course of an adjudica
tive proceeding, the Commission should consider whether it would
be strategically better to enact rules that establish substantiation re
quirements for particular products or for particular types of claims.
There are some decided disadvantages in attempting to develop a
rule under which to operate the advertising substantiation program.
The Commission would have to define with specificity the standards
for determining what constitutes sufficient substantiation. 30o The
Commission may not be able to accomplish that in a single rule that
applies to all industries. 301 The Commission would have to develop
an elaborate cost benefit analysis. 302 However, the economic costs
and benefits would only be the beginning of the analysis. A political
determination of the desirability of withstanding the cost would also
be essential. Developing a rule might be a waste of funds since
298. See, F. MILLER & B. CLARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 422
(1980).
299. For the argument that it is not acceptable to use the practices of the industry
involved to determine whether behavior is deceptiveP, see supra note 270 and
accompanying text. The claims are from the business community in general and not just
the particular industry of the advertiser whose advertisement is challenged.
In fact, many of the responses to the Commission's request for comments regarding
the advertising substantiation program indicated that even before the announcement of
the Pfizer doctrine they would not make claims without substantiation. See, e.g., Proctor &
Gamble Co., Remarks in Response to the FTC's Request for Comments About the
Advertising Substantiation Program 1 (July 14, 1983) (FTC's request available in 48
Fed. Reg. 10471) [hereinafter cited as Proctor & Gamble].
300. Rules must "define with specificity ... unfair or deceptive acts or practices...."
15 U.S.C. § 57a(I)(B) (1982).
301. See, e.g., Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1979)
(emphasizing specificity in rules). The Gibbs decision is discussed supra note 75, and
accompanying text.
302. See EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 36 n.84. The statement of basis and purpose
that accompanies the rule must include "a statement as to the economic effect ofth rule.
. .." 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(I)(C) (1982). Some rules must be accompanied by a
"regulatory analysis" that contains an analysis of "the projected benefits and any
adverse economic effects" of the rule. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3(b)(I)(G) (1982). The contents
of the regulatory analysis are not subject to judicial review. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3(c)(l)
(1982). Although not explicitly provided for by statute, presidential orders require cost
benefit analysis by the Office of Management and Budget. See Executive Order 12498
(January 4, 1985), Executive Order 12291 (February 17, 1981).
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there is now a developing body of case law dealing with the substan
tiation doctrine. A rule would not save the Commission a great deal
of effort in enforcement since the Commission would still need to
use the same procedures it now uses to detect violations. In addi
tion, the agency might be abdicating to the courts its discretion to
determine the advertisement's implied message and to evaluate the
adequacy of the substantiation. 303
An advantage of proceeding by rule is that civil penalties imposed
when the practice is flrst detected might provide a greater deterrent
than the cease and desist order which provides for penalties only
when there is a violation. 304 The FTCA does, however, permit the
Commission to notify businesses not parties to the cease and desist
proceeding of the nature of the cease and desist order. Persons with
such notice may be liable for violating the order.305 However it is
not clear if a general cease and desist substantiation order could be
treated this way. Rather the order would have to be very specific.
For example the order in Bristol Myers specified the types of claims
and the required substantiation that could be made applicable to
other over-the-counter analgesic manufacturers. There is no record
of any Commission prosecution of violations of substantiation cease
and desist orders under this provision.
303. When the Commission issues a cease and desist order it conducts an
adjudicatory process to which courts grant great deferrence, whereas in the case of a
rule violation the Commission brings the original complaint directly before the Court
with no prior adjudication by the agency. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(I)(A) (1982).
304. Civil penalties and restitution are available for the first violation of a rule. 15
U.S.C. § 57(a)(I)-(i) (1982). Generally no penalty accompanies a cease and desist order,
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(I)(B) (1982), unless the Commission requires corrective advertising.
See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), mt. denied, 435 U.S.
950 (1978). The advertiser is only subject to civil penalties if the advertiser violates a
cease and desist order. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (1982). Those penalities may include
restitution to consumers if it is an act or practice that a reasonable man would know is
dishonest or fradulent. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2) (1982). That section has not as yet been
applied in an advertising substantiation context.
305. In 1975, the following provision was added to the FTCA. Pub. L. No.,88 Stat.
2183,93-637 (1975):
If the Commission determines ... that any act or practice is unfair or
deceptive, and issues a final cease and desist order with respect to such
act or practice, then the Commission may commence a civil action ...
against any person, partnership, or corporation which engages in such act
or practice
(1) after such cease and desist order becomes final (whether or not
such person, partnership or corporation was subject to such cease and desist
order). and
(2) with actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or
deceptive and is unlawful. . . .
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(I)(B) (1982) (emphasis added).
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INDUSTRY ROUNDS

There has been considerable debate over the appropriate way for
the Commission to conduct investigations to determine the level of
substantiation that advertisers have for particular claims. As indi
cated above 306 soon after announcing its intention to require claim
substantiation the Commission began conducting "industry
rounds." These rounds involved sending requests for substantia
tion to all major sellers in a particular industry. In 1971, requests
were sent to seven automobile manufacturers, twelve television set
manufacturers, and eight dentrifrice manufacturers. 307
The industry rounds procedure underwent a number of changes
since 1972. Early rounds focussed more on express claims in adver
tisements while in 1974 the Commission began to focus on claims
implied in advertisements as well. 308 The rounds consisted of sum
maries of advertisements run by the manufacturers with a series of
claims which the Commission stated may be expressed or implied in
the advertisement. The Commission then included the following
demand:
With regard to each of these claims and without regard to
whether you believe that the specified claims are contained in
advertisements, state whether or not the Corporation had sub
stantiation for each of the specified claims at the time of the
initial and each subsequent dissemination of such advertising.
For those claims which the Corporation maintains are substan
tiated, submit all documents, back-up data and any other
materials that support, refute or otherwise relate to the claims.
Your submission must include all substantiation, in any form
upon which the claim is based and upon which the Corpora
tion relied at the time of the dissemination of the
advertising. 309
The Commission began in 1973 to apply case selection criteria to
the selection of industries and claims to investigate. 3Io Another
change was attempted in 1976. Rather than surveying advertisers in
particular industries the Commission experimented with cross in
306. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
307. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at Appendix A, pages 1-2.
308. See, e.g., Sears, supra note 270, at 7.
309. ld. at Exhibit B page 2.
310. Although a variety of criteria were explored, the following is representative of
the considerations applied:
With regard to selecting products and industries the staff
recommended that the Commission must
(a) focus on concentrated, ologopolistic controlled industries 
dominated by a few companies;
Id. at 19.

1986]

ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION

73

dustry rounds in which the Commission would focus on types of
claims. For example, the Commission questioned four manufactur
ers regarding the use of the results of preference polls in advertis
ing3ll and questioned seven advertisers regarding energy savings
claims. 3l2
For reasons of budget and program emphasis no industry rounds
have been conducted since 1977. The Commission has relied on a
technique referred to as "informal demand letters." These letters
are sent to specific advertisers in response to a review of their adver
tising and request substantiation of specific claims. Demand letters
differ from Industry Rounds in that they do not have the force of
compulsory process. If an advertiser refuses to respond to the let
ter, the Commission would then have to issue a Civil Investigative'
Demand in order to compel production of the information. sIs
The Commission has announced that it is formally abandoning
the use of industry rounds. S14 In announcing the changes in the pro
gram Chairman Miller indicated that most of the respondents to the
request for comments suggested that the Commission abandon the
use of industry wide rounds and concentrate on individual investiga
tions. He concluded that the rounds were time consuming and not
cost effective for advertisers as well as the Commission itself. 315
The Chairman correctly summarized the comments submitted to
the Commission316 but it is peculiar that he relied so heavily on the
conclusion of advertisers that the industry rounds are not an appro
priate procedure for the Commission. 317 The broad industry
rounds do appear to have advantages that cannot be achieved by the
informal demand letters. The sending of multi-firm detailed com
pulsory surveys seems to have a significant deterrent effect on ad
vertisers. 318 The Commission staff has expressed the view that the
31 L !d. at Appendix A, page 9. The advertisers were SCM Corporation, Standard
Brands, Inc., Ford Motor Co., and Radio Corp. of America.
312. Id. This included four manufacturers (Carrier Corp., Eureka Co., Toshiba
America Co., Tappan) and three advertising agencies (Young & Rubicam, Inc., N.W.
Ayre, ABH International, Hakuhodo Advertising, Inc.).
313. !d. at 30. It is not clear whether refusal to comply with an informal demand letter
would be grounds for the Commission to allege that the advertiser does not have
substantiation for a claim.
314. SUSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19.
315. Miller, supra note 136, at 4.
316. ANA, supra note 283, at 2.
317. He refers to them as "commentators" (a word usually reserved for scholarly
comments on the law) rather than industry respondents or commentators. But see
Consumer Union, supra note 222, at 3 (also questions use of industry rounds).
318. The House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs
report on the activities of the Division of National Advertising, concluded that the
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"failure to exhibit a strong enforcement presence in challenging
ambiguous or unsubstantiated claims would weaken the impact of
the program and encourage other advertisers to emulate the
practices."319
Neither a demand letter procedure nor a subpoena provide the
Commission with the power to require specially prepared reports
such as a "layperson report" which can aid the Commission or the
general public. 32o The industry rounds provide an excellent vehicle
for the Commission to attack deceptive P behavior.521 Moreover, by
requiring information of an entire industry or of advertisers which
use similar advertising it is possible for the Commission to discover
exactly where deception may be most prevalent. Rather than accept
the argument that advertisers should use industry standards, the
better approach might be to assume that it is in those industries
where all advertisers use inadequate substantiation that the Com
mission's actions would be most profitable. Especially in reference
to deceptiveP behavior, the one role the Commission can play is to
gradually develop standards industry by industry.322 There are par
ticular industries in which deception is more likely to occur. It is in
those industries where deception is more widespread that competi
tors may be less likely to attack the substantiation of other
advertisers. 323
In considering the costs and benefits of industry rounds it has
been argued that the use of industry rounds may have significant
costs. Chairman Miller stated that rounds were found to impose
substantial costs beyond those associated with firm specific requests,
section 6(b) rounds had a beneficial deterrent effect. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 26
n.77.
319. [d. at 19.
320. Demand letters, despite their names, invite voluntary compliance. Subpoenas
(or Civil Investigative Demands) can only be used to obtain documents already in the
recipient's possession. Section 6(b), however, enables the Commission to require
people to prepare reports. Section 6(b) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1982), and is
set out supra note 21.
321. The House Committee on Government Operations expressed the view that
industry rounds had a strong deterrent effect and encouraged the Commission to revive
the program. See House Committee on Government Operations Federal Trade Commission
Oversight-Rulemaking, Advertising, and Consumer Access, H.R. Doc. 472, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Oversight].
322. See supra text accompanying note 294.
323. In Pfizer, it is stated that one of the things they did was make sure they were not
promising more than their opponents. 81 F.T.C. 23, 71 (1972). Only by rounds would
we find that nobody in the industry has any proof for that particular claim. See
Consumers Union supra note 222, at 3 (rounds should be used when the types of claims
that are the subject of the inquiry are in widespread use).
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without yielding corresponding benefits for law enforcement. 324
However, not one of the advertisers who responded to the request
for comments gave any indication of the costs involved in preparing
industry round requests. 325 This is peculiar since this is the sort of
information that should be easily within their grasp. A logical con
clusion is that the expense is minimal.
Another cost of the use of the industry round procedure is the
extensive time it takes, both to prepare the surveys and to analyze
the responses. 326 The Commission began developing ways to pre
pare the requests in a more timely manner and it would seem that,
with less necessity for clearance to circulate the letters,327 the Com
mission should be able to develop adequate requests early. The
Commission might begin by requiring selected industries to submit
advertising campaigns prior to their dissemination.
Advertisers also complain that Commission requests state that
there are implied messages that the advertiser does not feel are con
tained in the ad. When the Commission requests substantiation the
advertisers have no vehicle to contest the Commission's interpreta
tion of the advertisement. 328 However, to the extent that Commis
sion policy with regard to determining when advertisements are
deceptive and what interpretations of advertisements sellers are re
sponsible for become clearer this should not be a problem.
It may be that as a vehicle for dealing with deceptive' behavior,
industry rounds are not necessary. The Commission could deter
mine in advance where it believes advertisers are making claims of
substantiation and can easily ask for the specific tests that relate to
324. Miller, supra note 136, at 4.
325. See, e.g., Sears, supra note 270, at 35 (acknowledges not having any "hard data"
identifying the dollar cost of complying with Commission requirements). In a review of
all of the industry submissions to the Commission this writer could find no estimates of
the costs of compling with Commission requests. The closest is the following:
Since 1972, Proctor & Gamble has been involved in four industry
substantiation sweeps dealing with 23 of our brands, and over 50
separate claims. As a result of these inquiries, we have submitted over
1000 pages of data and documents. The mere physical task of assembling
this material consumed hundreds of hours and cost many thousands of
dollars.
Proctor & Gamble, supra note 299, at 2. One reason companies may be reluctant to be
specific regarding costs is that they often also state that they develop substantiation any
way. See, e.g., ld. at I ("[W]e have operated since the imposition of the 1972 'Pfizer
doctrine' very much as we did before.").
326. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 31-32.
327. One way Congress could make the industry round process more efficient would
be to eliminate the requirement that questionnaires be approved by the Officer of
Management and Budget before they are circulated. See Paperwork Reduction Act of
1980,44 U.S.C. § 3507 (1982).
328. Sears, supra note 270, at 14.
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those claims. A demand letter would be sufficient for that purpose.
But where we are dealing with deceptive P behavior industry rounds
may be a relatively inexpensive way of beginning the process of de
veloping industry wide standards.

VIII.

PUBLIC INSPECTION

A primary goal of the early ad substantiation program was that the
public itself would be able to use the substantiation data in evaluat
ing products and that sellers would police the advertising of com
petitors. 329 In fact the then Chairman of the Commission hoped
that, "As we increase the flow of relevant information, we may
thereby increase the consumer's ability to make rational choices be
tween competing products, and thereby diminish the necessity for
formal commission action. . .. "330 For this reason an important
aspect of the program when it was first announced by the Commis
sion involved making the substantiating materials available for pub
lic inspection.
However, this aspect of the program never achieved its antici
pated results. Commission records revealed that the substantiation
material were infrequently inspected. 331 There is no indication that
the available materials were used in a significant way.332 In 1973 the
Commission staff began thinking of the advertising substantiation
program as an integral part of the Commission's law enforcement
program. In other words substantiation should be viewed merely as
one step in developing a case for litigation. 333 The coup de grace was
the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 which
prevented the Commission from making any of the material pub
lic. 334 The Commission has obviously accepted that verdict regard
ing the effectiveness of the "public education" aspect of the
program since no mention of it has been made in recent statements
by Commissioners or staff documents and no question regarding it
appeared in the public comment notice of 1983. There are a variety
of reasons for the apparent failure of this aspect of the program.
Academic institutions, public interest organizations, and competi
tors did not analyze the documentation as the Commission had
329. See Reports, supra note 20.
330. Kirkpatrick, Regulating in the Public Interest, 26 FOOD DRUG

COSMo

L.

J. 593, 597

(1971).

331. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 23.
332. For example, there is no evidence that the substantiating materials ever spawned
a competitor or consumer suit.
333. See EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 14.
334. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

1986]

ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION

77

hoped. 335 Partly this was the result of the fact that many respon
dents submitted vast quantities of highly technical material much of
which was irrelevant. 336 There also appears to have been a long
time lag of at least a year between the date the advertising first ap
peared and the date the substantiation was available to the public. 337
There was some concern that legitimate business interests in trade
secrets might be endangered by the program. This was partly con
firmed by the fact that competitors were the most frequent users of
substantiating materials. 338
The concept of requiring advertisers to make substantiation of ad
vertising claims available to the public is not unique to the Commis
sion's 1971 substantiation resolution. Commission cease and desist
orders require substantiation materials be available to the public.339
Requiring disclosure of substantiation material is consistent with
the goal of preventing deceptiveP behavior. The the extent that an
advertiser knows substantiation will be scrutinized the advertiser
would be more reluctant to make untrue claims. The degree of
complexity of the material submitted should not be viewed as a fatal
flaw in the program. It is probably unreasonable to suppose that
substantiation materials will be examined by consumers themselves.
Rather expert consumer intermediaries (such as the Consumers
Union) would be the most likely inspectors. 34o The Commission
can require advertisers to prepare "lay summaries" or at least sum
maries which would make expert examination of the material sub
mitted more fruitfuJ.341 Also competitors would have the expertise
335. See Comment, supra note 106, at 458 (citing GAO report that indicates that
consumer groups expressed little interest in date).
336. "[TJhe public education goal was largely frustrated because the substantiation
submitted by the advertisers was too technical for the average consumer (or staff
member) to evaluate." EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 23. See also Oversight, supra note 321,
at 21 (material submitted was too technical and scientific for consuming public). In
proposing the Truth in Advertising Act, Senator Moss reported that some of the
justification material submitted to the Commission was in foreign languages or in such
volume as to make the pertinent facts impossible to find. 119 CONGo REC. 11527, 11528
(1973) (Statement of Sen. Moss).
337. Oversight, supra note 321, at 12.
338. See EVOLUTION, supra note 20. See supra note 9 for language added to protect
trade secrets.
339. See, e.g., Camp Chevrolet, 84 F.T.C. 648 (1974) (consent order requiring making
statistical tests or surveys of driving experience available to public).
340. This author attempted to discover the extent to which Consumers Union did or
could use substantiation materials. While Consumers Union has used materials
submitted to the Commission by advertisers, the organization did not know if the
material had been submitted as part of the substantiation program. See Letter from
Mark Silbergeld to Charles Shafer (May 22, 1985).
341. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. In the proposed Truth in Advertising
Act, the term documentation itself was defined to include a layman's language summary
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to examine substantiation materials. The fact that they have not
done so seems unpersuasive. The program was in effect for less
than 10 years before being completely abandoned. In fact, it ap
pears that only recently have businesses begun litigating the falsity
of competitors' claims. 342
The trade secret problem also appears insubstantial. Trade
secrets can only apply to the content or manufacturing process not
to whether the product actually performs as promised. Where an
advertiser claims trade secret protection it should be able to docu
ment the claimed effectiveness of the product. Therefore, the only
problem that would arise is where a manufacturer claimed a novel
ingredient (which is a trade secret) causes a result which is not sus
ceptible to any kind of substantiation. In this limited case it would
not be too burdensome to require a clear statement in the advertise
ment indicating proof of the claim cannot be documented.
Finally, the fact that advertisers appeared to be so uncooperative
in supplying substantiation materials may be an indication that the
attempt of the Commission to assemble materials for public inspec
tion was a good idea and not a bad one. It may indicate that there
are actually a significant number of advertising claims which cannot
be substantiated and that advertisers do not want that information
readily available for consumers. That may indicate substantial bene
fits are available which warrant reviving this aspect of the program
and devoting some resources to properly policing it.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Trade Commission under Chairman William Miller
has emphasized the potentially negative effects of advertising regu
lation and has modified much of the regulation imposed by prior
Commissions. It has done so by arguing that its policies are now
more rational, empirically based and economically justified. How
ever, careful analysis reveals that the formulations of words pre
ferred by the current Commission are no more helpful in making
rational policy decisions than those of the past. Without a standard
that gives genuine guidance in evaluating empirical research, such
research is of little use.
I have focused on one important aspect of the Commission's reg
ulation of misleading advertising, the requirement that advertising
of all tests in support of all claims in the advertisement. S. 1512, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), § 3(d)(I)(A), 119 CONGo REC. 11,527-11,528 (1973).
342. Koten, More Firms File Challenges to Rivals Comparative Ads, Wall St. j., Jan. 12,
1984, at 27, col. 1. See also NBC, supra note 50, at 4.
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claims be sufficiently substantiated. By considering the theoretical
justifications for such a requirement this article has identified two
essential foundations, the prevention of both "deceptive'" and
"deceptiveP" conduct, Since deception has primarily economic con
sequence, an economic standard produces guidance for the proper
design and use of empirical research.
The economic standard must be tempered by a recognition that
economic efficiency is only one legitimate value to be furthered by
government regulation. 343 Therefore the empirical research must
also be designed to reveal the nature of the groups protected and
formed by regulation. Regulators can then make political value
coices without hiding behind the cloak of "reasonable" and "likely
to mislead". I have outlined the various factors that must be iso
lated and considered and have demonstrated how they should be
evaluated. I have shown how an analysis of deceptive" and decep
tive P conduct must be different.
As a by product of my research I have discovered the paucity of
evidence to support the constant claims th<;lt the advertising sub
stantiation requirement has exorbitant costs. It appears that a truly
rigorous empirically based policy would have led the Commission to
continue rather than abandon the regulatory work of prior
Commissions.

343. Richard Craswell has writlen a thoughtful article on deceptive advertising.
Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U.L. REV. 657 (1985). With regard to
defining deception he concludes that a less mystical and more quantifiable definition is
in order. He opts for the following: "An advertisement is legally deceptive if and only if
it leaves some consumers holding a false belief about a product, and the ad could be
cost-effectively changed to reduce the resulting injury." !d. at 678. He does not appear
to recognize the need for the application of the other political values in the process of
defining deception which I advocate.

